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1 Introduction: The Semantics of Natural Language
In this paper we develop a new formal system of logic, which consists of
syntactic rules, derivation rules and a model-theoretic semantics. We then
make some meta-logical inquiries into the nature of this system, comparing
it with the ﬁrst-order predicate calculus or logic (FOL).
Our formal system is based on an analysis of the semantics of natural
language sentences, an analysis which departs in several basic respects from
the semantic analyses one ﬁnds in the literature. All these use some version
of FOL to analyze the semantic structure of natural language sentences; the
semantic structure of these sentences, so it is assumed, can be transparently
represented by their translation into some version of FOL. By contrast, we
think that some semantic features of some natural language sentences cannot
be captured by means of FOL, and that one distorts the semantic structure
of these sentences if one tries to represent it by such translations.
This alternative analysis of natural language semantics, together with a
criticism of the analysis suggested by FOL, are developed in detail in Ben-
Yami’s Logic & Natural Language (Ashgate, 2004). We shall mention some
Hendricks et al. (eds.):
First-Order Logic Revisited
Logos Verlag Berlin (2004), 173–223
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of this book’s central claims below, but – given the purpose and space of
this paper – we shall not attempt to justify them here. We have to refer the
reader to this book for the full justiﬁcation and development of these claims.
This semantic analysis, which is the basis of our formal system, should
also serve to clarify what we tried to achieve by this system’s development,
and what we did not. Usually, when one develops a new formal system of
logic, one does that in order to capture some inferences that hitherto one
could not capture, and frequently could not even express, in existing formal
systems. This was not our purpose. Rather, we tried to show that the
alternative analysis of the semantics of natural language can serve as the
basis for a formal system which is as powerful as some version of FOL, in
a sense to be made precise below. We wanted to show that one need not
abandon the semantic structure of natural language if one wants to apply a
deductive system of FOL’s power.
With this in mind we can proceed to a concise presentation of some of
the semantic claims made in Logic & Natural Language.
FOL distinguishes two kinds of expression which are not variables or log-
ical constants: predicates on the one hand and individual constants (and
possibly other closed terms as well) on the other. Individual constants trans-
late the proper-names and other singular referring phrases or expressions of
natural language, and can thus be said to refer to or designate particulars.
Accordingly, FOL can be said to recognize only one kind of referring expres-
sions: singular ones (but see the discussion of many-sorted logic below).
Natural language, by contrast, contains plural referring expressions as
well. These include plural pronouns (in English, ‘we’, ‘you’, ‘they’ and their
declined forms), plural demonstratives (‘these’, ‘those’), plural deﬁnite de-
scriptions (e.g., ‘my children’, ‘the students’), some phrases that resemble
both deﬁnite descriptions and proper-names (‘the Knights of the Round Ta-
ble’, ‘the Simpsons’), and conjunctions and disjunctions of singular and plu-
ral referring expressions (e.g., ‘Peter and/or Jane’, ‘Mary and the children’).
Such expressions may have other, non-referential uses as well; but they can
all be used to refer to several particulars.
The italicized words and phrases below are examples of the referential
use of expressions of these kinds:
We saw the Simpsons in the supermarket. These are my books.
My children are asleep. Peter and Jane should soon be here.
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What is involved in plural reference, vis-a`-vis singular reference, is straight-
forward. Whatever is achieved in referring to a single person or thing can be
achieved with respect to several persons or things, and we then have plural
reference.
When we talk about plural reference we mean referring to more than
a single person or thing. We do not mean referring to a set with many
members, to a complex individual, or to any other variation on these ideas.
We mean achieving with relation to more than a single thing what is achieved
by reference to a single one.
The great majority of existing attempts to translate sentences that con-
tain plural referring expressions into FOL are reductive, in the sense of trying
to analyze such expressions either as singular referring ones, or as involving
an implicit structure that contains referring expressions of the singular kind
only. But these analyses can be shown to be either mistaken or at least im-
plausible. Moreover, they are not motivated by any linguistic phenomenon,
but by the unjustiﬁed conviction that FOL must be capable of translating the
relevant sentences. Yet FOL cannot adequately represent the semantics of
natural language sentences containing plural referring expressions precisely
because it lacks such expressions. (Again, for the full development and jus-
tiﬁcation of these claims, and of some of the following, see Logic & Natural
Language.)
Now, the careful analysis of the functioning of common nouns in natu-
ral language shows, that in many cases, common nouns in quantiﬁed noun
phrases are plural referring expressions. For instance, in ‘Some children are
asleep’, ‘children’ is used to refer to children. Similarly, in ‘John met several
members of my college’, ‘members of my college’ is used to refer to persons,
several of which John met. (N.B.: It refers not to those met by John, but to
all members of my college.)
This is in marked contrast with the way FOL translates these expressions.
Common nouns are taken to be predicative not only when they function as
grammatical predicates, but when they appear in the grammatical subject
position as well. Already Frege, and as early as in his Begriﬀsschrift (§12),
has translated the subjects in the four Aristotelian quantiﬁed sentences by
predicates, and several times in his later writings he argued for this analysis.
Let us demonstrate the diﬀerence between the two approaches by one
standard example. The sentence
(1) All philosophers are wise
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is translated into FOL by the sentence
∀x(Philosopher (x) −→ Wise (x))
That is, the expression ‘philosophers’ is seen as contributing to the meaning of
the natural language sentence in the same way that ‘wise’ does: they are both
predicative; they are both used to say something about particulars referred
to in some other way. By contrast, on our analysis, ‘philosophers’ in (1) is
not predicative but referential ; it is used to specify which are the particulars
about which something is said (in this case, the philosophers). The same
applies to the use of ‘philosophers’ in the sentences ‘Some/Seven/Many/Most
philosophers are wise’.
The fact that his calculus did not contain plural referring expressions
forced Frege to introduce quantiﬁcation into it in a way that is far diﬀerent
from the way it functions in natural language. For Frege, and in FOL gener-
ally, quantiﬁers are operators that operate on sentential functions; they are
second-order concepts. This is not the way quantiﬁers function in natural
language, as we shall now explain.
When we quantify, we refer to a plurality of particulars, and say that spe-
ciﬁc quantities of them are such-and-such; quantiﬁcation involves reference
to a plurality. Natural language accomplishes this kind of reference by means
of plural referring expressions, which designate the plurality, or pluralities,
about which something is being said. And by using diﬀerent expressions,
natural language can refer to diﬀerent pluralities. By contrast, since FOL
uses concepts only as predicates, it has no plural referring expressions. The
plurality about which something is said by its sentences has to be presup-
posed, and diﬀerent sentences cannot specify diﬀerent pluralities (but see
again the notes on many-sorted logic below). In natural language, plural-
ities are introduced and speciﬁed by means of plural referring expressions;
in FOL, a plurality, which is unspeciﬁed by the sentence, is introduced by
presupposing a domain of discourse.
In order to speak of pluralities natural language sentences presuppose no
domain of discourse, in the technical sense in which this concept is used in
predicate logic semantics. A domain of discourse is a necessary component
of the semantics of FOL, which has no parallel in the semantics of natural
language. The idea of a domain of discourse may have important applications
for formal systems, and we shall use it ourselves in that context below. But
one distorts the semantics of natural language if one insists on ﬁnding a
domain there.
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This semantic diﬀerence results in a syntactic one as well. If the plurality
is referred to by some plural referring expression, the quantiﬁer has to be re-
lated in some syntactic way to the plural referring expression that indicates
the plurality of which a quantiﬁed claim is made. Consequently, in natural
language the quantiﬁer is attached to a noun that is used to refer to a plu-
rality, and together they form a noun phrase. However, if no expression is
used to refer to a plurality, but the plurality is presupposed by the quantiﬁed
construction, then the quantiﬁer does not have to be attached to any speciﬁc
component of the quantiﬁed sentence. Consequently, in FOL the quantiﬁer
operates on a sentential function.
This alternative semantic analysis of natural language can explain many
features of language that create diﬃculties for attempts to analyze it by
means of some version of FOL (including versions that use generalized quan-
tiﬁers). Among other things, it explains away several alleged ambiguities of
the copula; it explains some semantic features of natural kind terms and of
empty concepts; it yields a natural classiﬁcation of quantiﬁers (classifying
‘many’ and ‘most’, but not ‘more’, as belonging to the same family as ‘every’
and ‘some’); it explains the semantic need for some linguistic devices like an
aﬃrmative and negative copulas, active versus passive voice, etc.; and more
(cf. [1]).
Although in Logic & Natural Language a consistent deductive system
for natural language sentences was developed on the basis of this semantic
analysis, no attempt was there made to develop a rich artiﬁcial language,
with rigorous rules for wﬀs, derivation rules and a model-theoretic semantics.
This, as was said above, is our main purpose in this paper, to which we shall
now proceed. In doing this we shall also demonstrate that the new analysis
can be used as a basis for a formal system which resembles FOL in its power.
A note is in order here on the use of universal and existential sentences
below. When we use such sentences in our proofs, we adopt the conventions
customary in mathematics. In particular, we use ‘Every A is B’ as short for
‘If anything is A, then it is B’. This is meant to enable a more ﬂuent reading.
Since we use these conventions consistently, the diﬀerences between this way
of using sentences and the way they are commonly used in natural language
should not bother us.
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2 The Definitions of Our System
This part includes our deﬁnitions of a formal language and of a formula. It
also includes our deﬁnitions of truth in a model and our deductive system.
2.1 Some basic definitions
Definition 1 (Formal Language). A formal language L is a disjoint union
of nine sets: P – a set of one-place predicates, one of which is the predicate
Thing; R – a set of relation-signs or many-place predicates (to every one of
which we assign a natural number n > 1, called its number of places); S – a
denumerable set, whose members are called singular referring expressions (or:
SREs); A = {a, a1, a2, . . .} – the set of anaphors; {1, 2, 3, . . .} – the set of
indices; {∧,∨,¬,−→} – the set of sentence-connectives; {every, some} – the
set of quantiﬁers; {is, isn’t} – aﬃrmative and negative copulas; {), (, 〉, 〈, , }
– parenthesis and comma. The members of L are its signs.
Note: In order to fully determine a language L, it is enough to determine
P, R and S; the rest of the constituents are the same for all languages.
As we shall explain below, one-place predicates function in our system also
as plural referring expressions, as common nouns do in natural language.
One might claim that the name ‘predicates’ is not appropriate for such ex-
pressions; ‘concept-letters’ might have been more suitable. However, since
these expressions function also as predicates, and since the term ‘n-place
predicate’ will be convenient to use as a collective name for both one-place
and many-place predicates, we shall continue using this terminology in what
follows.
We shall also see that the extension of Thing in every model will be the
whole universe. We have added such a predicate to our system in order to
obtain formulas that refer to the whole domain. As we shall see, this will help
us translate formulas from FOL to our system. It should be noted, however,
that there is no internal need for such a predicate in our formal system, and
that the system can be developed without it, as indeed is the case with the
related system developed in [1].
Definition 2 (Quantified Noun-Phrase, Noun-Phrase). If P is a
one-place predicate, then every P and some P are quantiﬁed noun-phrases
(QNP). If α is a QNP or an SRE, then α is a noun-phrase (NP).
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In natural language there are quantiﬁed noun-phrases that contain a
deﬁning clause of some sort; for instance, ‘every man who owns a Jaguar’,
as used in ‘Every man who owns a Jaguar is rich’. Quantiﬁed noun-phrases
composed in this manner are not dealt with in the present paper, and are
not represented in the formal system developed below. We limit the sys-
tem developed here to QNPs in which the referring expression is a simple
(non-composed) one-place predicate.
The use of anaphors in our system resembles their use in natural lan-
guage. As we shall see below, anaphors in our system will always relate to
(an occurrence of) a noun-phrase, and their meaning will be determined with
relation to that noun-phrase. The relation ‘being anaphoric on’ is syntacti-
cally deﬁned as follows:
Definition 3 (Anaphors of a Noun-Phrase). Let ϕ be a string of signs.
An occurrence α of an anaphor in ϕ is anaphoric on an occurrence t of an
NP δ in ϕ if the following conditions hold: t is to the left of α; the same index
k appears in parenthesis both immediately to the left of t and immediately to
the left of α; the string (k) does not occur immediately to the left of any sign
that is not an anaphor between t and α. In this case, we may also say that
α is an anaphor of t, and that t is the source of α.
Example: In the string (((1)s1, (2) every P ) is R) −→ (((2)a, (1)a) is L),
the ﬁrst (i.e. the leftmost) occurrence of a is anaphoric on the occurrence of
every P ; the second – on the occurrence of s1.
In natural language, a given relation can be represented in various forms: the
sentences ‘John kissed Mary’ and ‘Mary was kissed by John’, for instance,
represent the same relation, as do the sentences ‘John gave this book to
Mary’, ‘This book was given by John to Mary’, ‘To Mary was this book
given by John’, etc. We call such variations transpositions. To represent
these in our system, we use the following deﬁnition:
Definition 4 (Transpositions). Let R be an n-place predicate, n > 1,
and let τ be a non-trivial permutation (i.e., not the identity permutation) of
{1, . . . , n}. Then the string R〈τ(1), . . . , τ(n)〉 is a transposition of R. (The
symbol τ here does not belong to our formal language; it belongs to the meta-
language.) Thus, if R is a 3-place predicate, its transpositions are R〈1, 3, 2〉,
R〈2, 1, 3〉, etc.
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Note: For the sake of convenience, we shall sometimes refer to R as
R〈τ(1), . . . , τ(n)〉, where τ is the identity permutation.
Note: If t is an occurrence of a certain sign, or string of signs, in a string ϕ,
and α is a sign, or a string of signs, then we write ϕ[t/α] to denote the string
that is the product of replacing t with α in ϕ. In case several occurrences
t1, . . . , tn are replaced by α1, . . . , αn, we write: ϕ[t1/α1, . . . , tn/αn]. Some-
times we would like to replace all occurrences of a certain sign (or string of
signs) α in a string ϕ by another sign or string β. To refer to the product of
such a replacement we write: ϕ[α/β].
Note: If α is a sign, or a string of signs, that occurs in a string ϕ, then, in
order to emphasize the fact that ϕ contains α, we shall sometimes refer to ϕ
as ϕ(α).
2.2 Formulas
Our formation rules are somewhat more complex than those of FOL. We
shall ﬁrst give a brief sketch of these rules, and several examples of formu-
las together with the English sentences they translate. Only then shall we
proceed to give the exact deﬁnition of a formula.
Our atomic formulas include strings of the form: (s1, . . . , sn) is R, which
are meant to express a relation between n individuals, and: (s1, . . . , sn) isn’t
R, which are meant to deny such a relation. We allow the forming of new
formulas from given ones by means of sentence connective in the usual man-
ner.
Another thing we allow is the replacement of some occurrences of an
SRE by anaphors of another occurrence of the same SRE. Thus, for in-
stance, since (s, s) is L is a formula, ((1)s, (1)a) is L is also a formula. The
ﬁrst of these two can translate ‘John loves John’; the second – ‘John loves
himself’. Anaphors are written with indices to their left, to indicate their
being anaphoric on a certain occurrence of an NP.
Under certain conditions, we also allow the replacement of an SRE by a
QNP. We thus have formulas such as (every M, s) is L (which can translate
‘Every man loves John’), ((1) every M, (1)a) is L (‘Every man loves himself’)
and also (every M, some W ) is L (‘Every man loves some women’).
Let us now turn to the exact deﬁnitions. We shall start with a deﬁnition
of atomic formula, and proceed by induction.
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Definition 5 (Atomic Formula). A string of signs ϕ in a language L is
an atomic formula if it is of one of the following forms: s1 is s2; s1 isn’t s2;
(s1, . . . , sn) is R; (s1, . . . , sn) isn’t R, where s1, . . . , sn are SREs and R is an
n-place predicate (n ≥ 1) or a transposition of such a predicate.
Definition 6 (#ϕ). Let ϕ be a (ﬁnite) sequence. #ϕ is the length of ϕ. If ϕ
is a string of signs in a language L, then #ϕ is the number of sign-occurrences
in ϕ.
Definition 7 (Formula, Sub-Formula, Main QNP). Let ϕ be a string
of signs in a language L.
1. If #ϕ ≤ 3, then ϕ is a formula iﬀ it is an atomic formula.
2. Assume that #ϕ = n, and that for any string ψ for which #ψ < n, it
is determined whether ψ is a formula.
Deﬁne: Let δ and ψ be strings of signs in L such that #δ,#ψ < n.
Then:
(i) δ is a sub-formula of ψ if the following conditions hold: ψ is a
formula; #δ < #ψ; δ is contained in ψ as a string; δ itself is a
formula, or the product of one or more of the following operations
on a formula: substitution of anaphors (with indices to their left)
for SREs, addition of indices in parenthesis to the left of some NP
occurrences, substitution of NPs for other NP occurrences.
(ii) An NP occurrence t in ψ is distributed in ψ if there is no sub-
formula of ψ that contains both t and all its anaphors.
Now, ϕ is a formula iﬀ one of the following conditions holds:
(a) ϕ is an atomic formula.
(b) There are formulas α and β such that: #α,#β < n; α, β do not
contain anaphors of SRE occurrences; ϕ ∈ {¬(α), (α)∨ (β), (α)∧
(β), (α) −→ (β)}.
(c) There is a formula ψ and an index k such that: #ψ < n; c1, . . . , cn
are occurrences of an SRE s in ψ, ordered from left to right; none
of c1, . . . , cn has an index in parenthesis to the left of it; the string
(k) does not occur between c1 and cn; if (k) occurs to the right of
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cn and is immediately followed by an anaphor, then this anaphor
has a source that lies to the right of cn ; a2, . . . , an are anaphors;
ϕ is ψ[c1/(k)s, c2/(k)a2, . . . , cn/(k)an].
(d) There is a formula ψ, an SRE s and a QNP qP such that: #ψ <
n; c is a distributed occurrence of s in ψ; ψ does not contain
distributed occurrences of QNPs to the left of c; other than c, no
SRE occurrence in ψ has anaphors; ϕ is ψ[c/qP ]. In this case,
the occurrence of qP that replaced c is called the main QNP in ϕ.
Note: We shall sometimes omit parenthesis, where this is unlikely to cause
confusion. For instance, we shall refer to ((α) ∧ (β)) ∧ (γ) as α ∧ β ∧ γ; to
(s) is P as s is P ; and to (every Q) is P as every Q is P .
Theorem 1 (Induction on Formulas). Let A be a set of formulas in a
language L and assume that A satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. All the atomic formulas of L are members of A.
2. If α, β ∈ A do not contain anaphors of SRE occurrences, then ¬(α),
(α) ∧ (β), (α) ∨ (β), (α) −→ (β) ∈ A.
3. If ψ ∈ A and ϕ is the product of substituting anaphors for SRE occur-
rences in ψ as described in section 2c of the formula deﬁnition, then
ϕ ∈ A.
4. If ϕ(qP ) is a formula in which an occurrence t of qP is the main QNP,
then: if A contains every formula of the form ϕ[t/s], where s is an
SRE, then ϕ ∈ A.
Then, A contains all the formulas in L.
To prove this theorem, one can prove, by induction on #ϕ, that for any
ﬁnite string ϕ, if ϕ is a formula, then ϕ ∈ A. We shall not give such a proof
here.
2.3 Models, truth in a model
As we have already mentioned, our system is based upon the analysis of
common nouns, in some of their uses, as referring expressions. The noun
‘whale’, for instance, is used referentially in sentences like ‘Every whale is a
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mammal’. ‘Whale’ refers here to whales; it does not refer to a set of whales,
but to the whales themselves.
Now, for a referring expression to fulﬁll its task, there have to be some
thing or things to which it can refer. For instance, if there are no whales, then
‘whales’ in the previous example cannot fulﬁll its semantic task. To exclude
such failures of reference, we require that the extension of any one-place pred-
icate be non-empty. This requirement guarantees that every component of
our system fulﬁlls its semantic task. It can be compared with the requirement
in FOL, that any referring expression (i.e. any closed term; e.g., individual
constants) be interpreted as designating some individual. This last demand,
like the one stated above, excludes failures of reference. And while it yields
the result that ∃x(x = s) is true in every model in FOL, our demand con-
cerning the extensions of predicates gives the same status to formulas of the
form some P is P .
Definition 8 (Model). A model for a language L is an ordered pair
m = 〈M,σ〉 such that:
1. M , the universe of m, is a non-empty set.
2. σ, the interpretation function, is a function such that:
(a) The domain of σ is the set of all SREs, predicates and predicate-
transpositions of L.
(b) If s is a singular referring expression, then σ(s) ∈ M .
(c) σ(Thing) = M .
(d) If P is a one-place predicate, then σ(P ) is a non-empty subset of
M .
(e) If R is an n-place predicate, n > 1, then σ(R) ⊆ Mn.
(f) If R is an n-place predicate, n > 1, and τ is a non trivial permu-
tation of {1, . . . , n}, then
σ(R〈τ(1), . . . , τ(n)〉) = {〈xτ(1), . . . , xτ(n)〉|〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ σ(R)}.
Note: in order to fully determine a model, it is enough to determine M and
σ(α) for all SREs and predicates α.
It may be claimed that our requirement concerning the extensions of one-
place predicates is more than is really needed: the extension of a predi-
cate should be non-empty only if this predicate is used referentially, but in
‘Every S is P ’, for instance, P is not used in this way.
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Our system would have been closer to natural language had we taken the
following road: instead of excluding models that assign the empty set to some
one-place predicates, we could have allowed them, and say that a formula
containing a QNP of the form qP expresses a (true or false) proposition only
in models in which σ(P ) is non-empty. This alternative approach may also
be necessary if we would like to deal with quantiﬁed noun-phrases containing
a deﬁning clause, such as ‘every man who owns a Jaguar’. It seems that
the extension of ‘man who owns a Jaguar’ should be the set of all things
that are both men and own a Jaguar. And requiring every two extensions
to have a member in common seems to seriously limit our notion of model.
The alternative approach would, however, result in a much more complicated
system, and since we do not treat composed quantiﬁed noun-phrases to begin
with, we shall stick to our original requirement: the extension of one-place
predicates should never be empty.
Definition 9 (The Characteristic SRE). For every Language L, let cL
be a new sign, not in L. L∗ is deﬁned as the language L∪ cL, in which cL is
an SRE. cL is the characteristic SRE of L.
The above notion will be used in the deﬁnition of truth in a model. The
idea is the following. Given a model m for L and a predicate P , we shall
look at all the enrichments m′ of m to the language L∗ that interpret cL
as a member of the extension of P . These enrichments, which we shall call
σ(P )-enrichments, will enable us to deﬁne the truth-conditions of quantiﬁed
formulas: a formula ϕ(qP ), in which an occurrence t of qP is the main QNP,
will be true in m iﬀ ϕ[t/cL] is true in q of the σ(P )-enrichments of m. Let
us now give the exact deﬁnitions.
Definition 10 (Enrichment, Restriction). Let L1, L2 be formal lan-
guages, and assume L1 ⊆ L2.1 Let m1 = 〈M1, σ1〉 and m2 = 〈M2, σ2〉 be
models for L1, L2 respectively. m2 is an enrichment of m1 to L2 if the fol-
lowing conditions hold: M1 = M2; σ1 ⊆ σ2 (i.e., for every predicate or SRE
α in L1, σ2(α) = σ1(α)). m1, in this case, is a restriction of m2 to L1.
Definition 11 (A-enrichment). Let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model for a language
L, and let A ⊆ M . An enrichment m′ = 〈M ′, σ′〉 of m to L∗ is an A-
enrichment of m if σ′(cL) ∈ A.
1We assume here that for every n, each n-place predicate of L1 is an n-place predicate
of L2, each SRE of L1 is an SRE of L2, etc.
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Note: In order to determine a speciﬁc A-enrichment m′ of m, it is enough
to choose a member α ∈ A and deﬁne σ′(cL) = α.
Definition 12 (Truth-conditions of Atomic Formulas). Let ϕ be an
atomic formula in a language L, and let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model for L. The
relation m |= ϕ ( ϕ is true in m) is deﬁned as follows:
1. If s1, s2 are SREs, then: m |= [s1 is s2] iﬀ σ(s1) = σ(s2);
m |= [s1 isn’t s2] iﬀ σ(s1) = σ(s2).
2. If R is an n-place predicate ( n ≥ 1) or a transposition of such a
predicate, and s1, . . . , sn are SREs, then:
m |= [(s1, . . . , sn) is R] iﬀ 〈σ(s1), . . . , σ(sn)〉 ∈ σ(R);
m |= [(s1, . . . , sn) isn’t R] iﬀ 〈σ(s1), . . . , σ(sn)〉 ∈ σ(R).
Definition 13 (Truth-conditions of Formulas). Let ϕ be a ﬁnite se-
quence, Let L be any language in which ϕ is a formula, and let m = 〈M,σ〉
be a model for L. The relation m |= ϕ is deﬁned by induction on #ϕ:
1. If #ϕ ≤ 3, then ϕ is an atomic formula in L, and its truth-conditions
in m are deﬁned as in deﬁnition 12.
2. Let n = #ϕ, and assume that for any k < n, if ψ is a string of length
k, L′ is a language in which ψ is a formula, and m′ is a model for L′,
then it is already determined whether m′ |= ψ. Let L be a language in
which ϕ is a formula.
(a) If ϕ is an atomic formula, then its truth-conditions in any model
for L are as in deﬁnition 12.
(b) If α and β are formulas in L that do not contain anaphors of
SRE occurrences, then: m |= ¬(α) iﬀ m |= α; m |= [(α) ∧ (β)]
iﬀ m |= α and m |= β; m |= [(α) ∨ (β)] iﬀ m |= α or m |= β;
m |= [(α) −→ (β)] iﬀ it is not the case that m |= α and m |= β.
(c) If ϕ is the product of substituting anaphors for SRE occurrences
in a formula ψ as in section 2c of the formula deﬁnition, then
m |= ϕ iﬀ m |= ψ.
(d) If ϕ(qP ) is a formula that contains no anaphors of SRE occur-
rences, and in which an occurrence t of qP is the main QNP,
then:
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i. If q is every, then: m |= ϕ(every P ) iﬀ:
for every σ(P )-enrichment m′ of m, m′ |= ϕ[t/cL].
ii. If q is some, then: m |= ϕ(some P ) iﬀ:
for some σ(P )-enrichment m′ of m, m′ |= ϕ[t/cL].
Note: If m |= ϕ, we also say that m satisﬁes ϕ, and that ϕ holds in m.
The only two quantiﬁers treated in our system are ‘every’ and ‘some’. It
should be noted, however, that our deﬁnition of the truth-conditions of
quantiﬁed formulas can easily be extended to treat other quantiﬁers as well.
Our basic idea was, that ϕ(qP ) is true in m iﬀ ϕ[t/cL] is true in q σ(P )-
enrichments of m. And this remains true for quantiﬁers such as ‘seven’, ‘at
least three’ and ‘most’. Our analysis of quantiﬁcation gives a uniform ac-
count of all these quantiﬁers, as can be expected in view of the syntactic
similarities between them in natural language. Such a uniform analysis is
not available if we use standard versions of FOL as a tool for the analysis
of natural language. As is well known, these versions cannot incorporate
quantiﬁers such as ‘most’, which require restricted or binary quantiﬁcation
(cf. [1, section 6.4]; [4]).
Definition 14 (Theory). A theory T in a language L is a set of formulas
in L.
Definition 15 (Model of a Theory). Let T be a theory in a language L.
m is a model of T if it is a model for L and m |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ T . In that
case, we may also say that m satisﬁes T , etc.
Definition 16 (Entailment). A theory T entails a formula ϕ if ϕ is true
in every model of T . In this case, we write: T |= ϕ.
2.4 Deduction
We shall use a natural deduction system. Our way of writing proofs resembles
the one found in Lemmon [5] and in Newton-Smith [6].
Definition 17 (Proof). Let L be a formal language. A proof in L is a ﬁnite
sequence of 4-tuples of the form 〈α, (k), ϕ, J〉, called the lines of the proof,
where:
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(a) α is a ﬁnite (possibly empty) set of natural numbers, all of which are
smaller than or equal to k. Lines 〈α′, (k′), ϕ′, J ′〉 in the proof for which
k′ ∈ α will be called the lines on which the k-th line relies. The formulas
ϕ′ in such lines will be called the formulas on which the k-th line relies.
(b) k, the line’s number, is a natural number. The ﬁrst line in a proof has
k = 1, the second – k = 2, etc.
(c) ϕ is a formula in L.
(d) J , the justiﬁcation of the k-th line, is written in accordance with one
of the following rules.
The following derivation rules allow the beginning of a proof and the
addition of lines to a given proof. In fact, these rules complete deﬁnition 17
to a precise deﬁnition of proof, by induction on the number of lines.
For the sake of convenience, we occasionally drop the parenthesis ‘〈, 〉’ or
commas when referring to lines in a proof. Also, instead of writing the set of
lines on which a certain line relies, we sometimes write the members of this
set. In case this set is empty, we may not write anything. Another convenient
convention is the following: a proof containing a single line is identiﬁed with
that line.
17.1 (Premise). If ϕ is a formula in L, then 〈1(1)ϕ Premise〉 is a proof.
Also, if D is a proof of length k − 1 (i.e., it has exactly k − 1 lines),
then we may add to D the line: 〈k(k)ϕ Premise〉 (that is: the addition
of such a line to D gives a proof).
17.2 (Thing Introduction). If s is an SRE, then 〈(1)s is Thing Th I〉 is
a proof. Also, if D is a proof of length k − 1, then we may add to D
the line: 〈(k)s is Thing Th I〉.
17.3 (Identity Introduction). If s is an SRE, then 〈(1)s is s Id I〉 is a
proof. Also, if D is a proof of length k − 1, then we may
add to D the line 〈(k)s is s Id I〉.
17.4 (Identity Elimination). Let D be a proof of length k − 1. Assume
that s and s′ are SREs, and that D includes the line: 〈α(i)s is s′Ji〉.
Assume also that D includes a line of the form 〈β(j)ϕJj〉, where ϕ con-
tains the occurrences c1, . . . , cn of s (ϕ may contain other occurrences
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of s as well).
Then we may add to D the line 〈α∪β(k)ϕ[c1/s′, . . . , cn/s′] Id E, i, j〉.2
17.5 (Propositional Calculus Rules). We allow the usual propositional
calculus derivation rules for formulas that do not contain anaphors of
SRE occurrences. We shall give only two examples here:
−→ Introduction. Let D be a proof of length k − 1. If D con-
tains the lines 〈i(i)ϕ Premise 〉; 〈β(j)ψJ〉, where ϕ and ψ do not con-
tain anaphors of SRE occurrences, then we may add to D the line
〈β\{i} (k)ϕ −→ ψ −→ I, i, j〉.
∨ Elimination. Let D be a proof of length k−1. Assume that D con-
tains the lines 〈α(i)ϕ ∨ ψJi〉; 〈j(j)ϕ Premise 〉; 〈β(l)δJl〉;
〈m(m)ψ Premise 〉; 〈γ(n)δJn〉, where ϕ and ψ do not contain anaphors
of SRE occurrences, j ∈ γ and m ∈ β. Then we may add to D the line
〈((β ∪ γ)\{j,m}) ∪ α(k)δ ∨ E, i, j, l,m, n〉.
17.6 (Transposition). Let D be a proof of length k − 1, and let τ and
ξ be any permutations of {1, . . . , n}. Assume that D contains the
line 〈α(i)(sτ(1), . . . , sτ(n)) is R〈τ(1), . . . , τ(n)〉J〉 , where s1, . . . , sn are
SREs. Then we may add to D the line
〈α(k)(sξ(1), . . . , sξ(n)) is R〈ξ(1), . . . , ξ(n)〉 Tr , i〉.
17.7 (Negative-Copula Introduction). Let D be a proof of length k −
1. Let R be an n-place predicate ( n ≥ 1) or a transposition of
such a predicate, and let s1, . . . , sn be SREs. If D contains the line
〈α(i)¬((s1, . . . , sn) is R)J〉, then we may add to D the line
〈α(k)(s1, . . . , sn) isn’t R NC I, i〉.
17.8 (Negative-Copula Elimination). Let D be a proof of length
k − 1. Let R be an n-place predicate ( n ≥ 1) or a transposition of
such a predicate, and let s1, . . . , sn be SREs. If D contains the line
〈α(i)(s1, . . . , sn) isn’t R J〉, then we may add to D the line
〈α(k)¬((s1, . . . , sn) is R)NC E, i〉.
17.9 (Anaphors Introduction). Let D be a proof of length k−1. Assume
that D contains the line 〈α(i)ψJ〉. If ϕ is the product of substituting
2It is not hard to show that substituting SRE occurrences for SREs in a formula gives
a formula. Therefore, ϕ[c1/s′, . . . , cn/s′] is a formula.
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anaphors for SRE occurrences in ψ as in section 2c of the formula
deﬁnition, then we may add to D the line 〈α(k)ϕA I, i〉.
17.10 (Anaphors Elimination). Let D be a proof of length k−1. Assume
that D contains the line 〈α(i)ϕJ〉. If ϕ is the product of substituting
anaphors for SRE occurrences in a formula ψ as in section 2c of the
formula deﬁnition, then we may add to D the line 〈α(k)ψA E, i〉.
17.11 (every Introduction). Let ϕ(every P ) be a formula in which an oc-
currence t of every P is the main QNP, and assume that ϕ does not
contain s. Let D be a proof of length k−1, and assume that D includes
the lines 〈i(i)s is P Premise〉; 〈β(j)ϕ[t/s]J〉. Also assume that β does
not contain any number diﬀerent than i of a line in which s occurs.
Then, we may add to D the line 〈β\{i}(k)ϕ(every P ) every I, i, j〉.
17.12 (every Elimination). Let ϕ(every P ) be a formula in which an oc-
currence t of every P is the main QNP, and let s be any SRE. Let
D be a proof of length k − 1, and assume that D includes the lines
〈α(i)ϕ(every P )Ji〉; 〈β(j)s is PJj〉. Then, we may add to D the line
〈α ∪ β(k)ϕ[t/s] every E, i, j〉.
17.13 (some Introduction). Let ϕ(some P ) be a formula in which an oc-
currence t of some P is the main QNP. Let D be a proof of length k−1,
and assume that D includes the lines 〈α(i)ϕ[t/s]Ji〉; 〈β(j)s is PJj, 〉,
where s is an SRE. Then we may add to D the line
〈α ∪ β(k)ϕ(some P ) some I, i, j〉.
17.14 (some Elimination). Let ϕ(some P ) be a formula in which an oc-
currence t of some P is the main QNP. Assume that ϕ does not con-
tain the SRE s, and that ψ is a formula that does not contain s.
Let D be a proof of length k − 1, and assume that D includes the
lines 〈α(i)ϕ(some P )Ji〉; 〈j(j)s is P Premise〉; 〈k(k)ϕ[t/s] Premise〉;
〈β(l)ψJl〉. Also assume that j, k ∈ α, and that β does not contain any
number, other than j and k, of a line in which s occurs. Then we may
add to D the line 〈(α ∪ β)\{j, k}(m)ψ some E, i, j, k, l〉.
17.15 (Referential Import). Let ϕ(every P ) be a formula in which an oc-
currence t of every P is the main QNP. Let D be a proof of length k−1,
and assume that D includes the line 〈α(i)ϕ(every P )J〉. Then we may
add to D the line 〈α(k)ϕ[t/some P ] RI, i〉.
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Referential Import captures the referential use of one-place predicates in
our system. With it the list of derivation rules of our system was concluded.
Definition 18 (TD(α)). If α is a set of numbers of lines in a proof D, then
TD(α) is the set of all formulas that appear in D in lines whose numbers
belong to α.
Definition 19 (Provability of Formulas). Let T be a theory in a language
L, and let ϕ be a formula in L. ϕ is provable from T in L, if there is a
proof D in L such that:
1. The last line in D is of the form: 〈α, (k), ϕ, J〉.
2. TD(α) ⊆ T (in other words: the last line of D relies only on members
of T).
D, in this case, is called a proof of ϕ from T .
Definition 20 (Provability of Theories). Let T1, T2 be theories in a lan-
guage L. T2 is provable from T1 if T1  ϕ for any ϕ ∈ T2. In this case we
write: T1  T2.
3 Some Examples of Formalization and Proofs
We shall now give a few examples of proofs in our formal system, so that
the reader gets a feel of it. These examples will also supply us with an
opportunity to comment on some of the characteristics of our system, mainly
in relation to other formal systems.
Consider ﬁrst the following inference (Contrariety):
Every philosopher is wise; hence, it’s not the case that every
philosopher isn’t wise.
These sentences translate into our system as:
every S is P ; ¬( every S isn’t P )
And the inference can be proved as follows:
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1 (1) every S isn’t P Premise
2 (2) every S is P Premise
2 (3) some S is P RI, 2
4 (4) s is S Premise
5 (5) s is P Premise
1, 4 (6) s isn’t P every E, 1, 4
1, 4 (7) ¬(s is P ) NC E, 6
1, 4, 5 (8) (s is P ) ∧ ¬(s is P ) ∧ I, 5, 7
4, 5 (9) ¬(every S isn’t P ) ¬ I, 1, 8
2 (10) ¬(every S isn’t P ) some E, 3, 4, 5, 9
Secondly, let us translate and prove the following inference (Darii):
Some philosophers are Athenians; every Athenian is Greek; hence,
some philosophers are Greek.
Its translation:
some S is M ; every M is P ; some S is P
And its proof:
1 (1) some S is M Premise
2 (2) every M is P Premise
3 (3) s is S Premise
4 (4) s is M Premise
2, 4 (5) s is P every E, 2, 4
2, 3, 4 (6) some S is P some I, 5, 3
1, 2 (7) some S is P some E, 1, 3, 4, 6
As the reader would have noticed, these two inferences are part of the valid
inferences of Aristotelian logic: the ﬁrst belongs to the Square of Opposition,
the second to the Syllogisms. All the other valid inferences of Aristotelian
logic can also be proved in our system (cf. [1, chap. 10]). Our system thus
contains Aristotelian logic. By contrast, on any acceptable translation of
the four Aristotelian sentences (every/some S is/isn’t P ) into FOL, some of
these inferences turn out invalid (unless some ad hoc axioms are added to the
calculus; see below). We think this demonstrates the fact that the analysis of
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the semantics of natural language on which our system is constructed is more
adequate than what a similar analysis, using only the semantic categories
of FOL, can supply. A formal system whose verdict on natural language
inferences coincides with what logicians considered valid for more than two
millennia obviously has a desirable feature.
On the other hand, unlike Aristotelian logic, our system can also prove
inferences that involve multiply quantiﬁed sentences. For instance:
Some women are loved by every man; hence, every man loves
some women.
Notice that these sentences use both the passive and the active form of
the same verb. This is translated into our system as a relation-sign and its
transposition. If we translate ‘a loves b’ as (a, b) is L, then ‘b is loved by
a’ should be translated as (b, a) is L〈2, 1〉. The former sentences are thus
translated as:
(some W, every M) is L〈2, 1〉; (every M, some W ) is L.
Let us now prove this inference:
1 (1) (some W, every M) is L〈2, 1〉 Premise
2 (2) s1 is W Premise
3 (3) (s1, every M) is L〈2, 1〉 Premise
4 (4) s2 is M Premise
3, 4 (5) (s1, s2) is L〈2, 1〉 every E, 3, 4
3, 4 (6) (s2, s1) is L Tr, 5
2, 3, 4 (7) (s2, some W ) is L some I, 6, 2
2, 3 (8) (every M, some W ) is L every I, 7, 4
1 (9) (every M, some W ) is L some E, 1, 2, 3, 8
Moreover, we can prove in our system inferences that involve sentences
with anaphors of quantiﬁed noun phrases, a capacity which greatly increases
our system’s power. We shall give one simple example:
Every man loves every man; hence, every man loves himself.
Its translation:
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(every M, every M) is L; ((1) every M, (1)a) is L.
And its proof:
1 (1) (every M, every M) is L Premise
2 (2) s is M Premise
1, 2 (3) (s, every M) is L every E, 1, 2
1, 2 (4) (s, s) is L every E, 3, 2
1, 2 (5) ((1)s, (1)a) is L A I, 4
1 (6) ((1) every M, (1)a) is L every I, 5, 2
These examples demonstrate the nature and power of our system.
4 Many-sorted Logic
Our formal system resembles in some ways many-sorted logic. We shall
therefore pause to discuss the relation between the two.
In many-sorted logic, diﬀerent sorts of variables are used, each sort having
its own domain. For instance, one occasionally uses x1, x2, x3 etc. to range
over particulars; e1, e2, e3 etc. to range over events; t1, t2, t3 etc. to range
over times; and so on. Since in this case the variables determine the sort of
pluralities about which something is said, and since diﬀerent sorts of variables
may determine diﬀerent sorts of pluralities, it seems many-sorted logic can
be considered a kind of logic with plural referring expressions, namely its
variables.
Yet a signiﬁcant logical distinction between many-sorted logic and our
formal system (and natural language) still remains. In our system, one-place
predicate letters can be used both as referring expressions and as predicates
(correspondingly, in natural language some concept-words are used both as
referring expressions and as one-place predicates). Consider, for instance,
the two sentences:
Some Athenians are philosophers.
Every philosopher is wise.
‘Philosophers’ is used as a predicate in the ﬁrst sentence and referentially in
the second. These sentences translate into our system as, respectively:
some A is P
every P is W
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Consequently, one can derive in our system the formula some A is W from
these two formulas by means of syntactic derivation rules.
By contrast, many-sorted logic would either use, like ordinary one-sorted
logic, the same variable when translating both sentences – in which case it
would not mirror our use of diﬀerent plural referring expressions in the two
sentence; or it may use diﬀerent variables in the two translations, e.g.:
∃x1Px1
∀y1Wy1.
Here x1 and y1 are variables of diﬀerent sorts. But in this latter case, as can
be seen, the syntactic relation between the predicate P in the ﬁrst formula,
and the variable y1 in the second, is lost. Consequently, one cannot derive
in this case by means of syntactic derivation rules the translation of natural
language’s ‘Some Athenians are wise’ (∃x1Wx1) from these two formulas.
This is obviously an undesirable result.
To avoid this result, one may use, for instance, the same letters both as
variables and as one-place predicate letters. Each one-place predicate will
then be interpreted as designating its own domain of discourse. Appropriate
syntactic derivation rules could then be introduced (which, although proba-
bly more complex than the usual ones, may be rather similar to those of our
system).
But additional modiﬁcations of many-sorted logic should also be intro-
duced. For instance, predicate letters in formulas of many-sorted logic usually
combine with variables of speciﬁc sorts in order to form well formed formulas
(see [2, pp. 295ﬀ]). However, in order to translate both ‘Every philosopher
is wise’ and ‘Some Athenians are wise’, the predicate W should combine
both with the variable P and the variable A. Similarly, individual constants,
which correspond in ordinary many-sorted logic to sorts, should not be clas-
siﬁed into sorts in the modiﬁed version, in order to translate sentences like
‘Socrates is an Athenian’ and ‘Socrates is a philosopher’. Moreover, in or-
der to distinguish between sentences like, say, ‘Every philosopher loves some
philosopher’ and ‘Every philosopher is loved by some philosopher’, several
variable letters should be assigned, as usual, to each sort or predicate let-
ter. If we use upper case letters for predicates, indexed lower case letters for
variables, these sentences would be translated as, respectively:
∀p1∃p2 Loves (p1, p2)
∀p1∃p2 Loves (p2, p1).
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This contrasts with our system, which uses no variables (or anaphors) for
such sentences:
(every P, some P ) is L
(every P, some P ) is L〈2, 1〉
As can also be seen, natural language’s need for a distinction between active
and passive voice, or some such linguistic device, which is preserved in our
formal system, is lost in many-sorted logic, in its modiﬁed form as well.
The same applies to the need for a distinction between an aﬃrmative and a
negative copula.
So many-sorted logic should be signiﬁcantly modiﬁed to resemble our
formal system, and even then some important distinctions would still remain.
Indeed, many-sorted logic, even in its usual form, can be shown to parallel
our system in its deductive power, in the sense that this will be shown below
for FOL. In fact, this follows immediately from the proofs that shall be
given below, together with the fact that many-sorted logic can be reduced to
one-sorted logic (see [2, pp. 296ﬀ]). But remember that our purpose in the
development of a new formal system was not to capture some new forms of
inference, but to show that an alternative analysis of the semantics of natural
language can serve as the basis for a formal system similar in its power to
FOL. Consequently, we do not consider the fact that our system is similar
in its power to FOL, on any of its versions – e.g., many-sorted logic – as a
drawback, but rather as an advantage.
5 Properties of Our Formal System
In this part we shall prove some of the properties of our system. Our main
goal will be to show that the system’s deductive power is comparable to that
of FOL. To be more precise, we shall prove that our system is equivalent
to FOL, supplemented by all axioms of the form ∃xPx, which we shall call
axioms of existential import. The set of all these axioms will be called EI.
We shall correlate models in our system with models of EI in FOL, and
deﬁne a translation of formulas in FOL into our system. We will prove this
translation to be one-to-one, and to cover all the formulas in our system in the
following sense: each of these formulas is both deductively and semantically
equivalent to a translation of some formula of FOL. We shall also prove that
the translation preserves truth in a model, entailment and provability. The
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existence of such a translation, together with the completeness of FOL will
entail the completeness of our system.
Let us now turn to the exact deﬁnitions and proofs.
5.1 Some basic results
This section contains some elementary lemmas and theorems that will be
used in the proofs below. Some of these results will be stated without proof.
Given a formula ϕ and a model m, we can change some of the SREs in
ϕ. If the new SREs are interpreted by m in exactly the same way as the old
ones, the replacement should not aﬀect the truth of ϕ in m. It should not
matter even if the new SREs belong to a language richer than the one we
started with, as long as we enrich m accordingly. This is, more or less, the
content of the following lemma. Its somewhat complex formulation is meant
to enable an easier proof by induction.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ be a formula in a language L, and assume that ϕ contains
the occurrences c1, . . . , cn of SREs s1, . . . , sn respectively (s1, . . . , sn not nec-
essarily diﬀerent). Let s′1, . . . , s
′
n and s
′′
1, . . . , s
′′
n be SREs, some (or all) of
which may not belong to L (s′1, . . . , s
′
n, s
′′
1, . . . , s
′′
n not necessarily diﬀerent).
Let m′ = 〈M ′, σ′〉 be a model for a language L′ that contains L∪{s′1, . . . , s′n},
and let m′′ = 〈M ′′, σ′′〉 be a model for a language L′′ that contains L ∪
{s′′1, . . . , s′′n}. Assume that m′ and m′′ coincide with m in L (that is: M ′ =
M ′′ = M , and σ′(α) = σ′′(α) = σ(α) for any α ∈ dom (σ)).
If m′ interprets s′1, . . . , s
′
n as m interprets s1, . . . , sn (i.e. σ
′(s′i) = σ(si)
for every i), and m′′ interprets s′′1, . . . , s
′′
n as m interprets s1, . . . , sn, then:
m′ |= ϕ[c1/s′1, . . . , cn/s′n] ⇐⇒ m′′ |= ϕ[c1/s′′1, . . . , cn/s′′n].
It is obvious that lemma 1 is true: from the deﬁnition of truth in a model
it can be seen that SREs contribute to the truth of ϕ in a given model only
through the way in which they are interpreted in that model; and if two SREs
are assigned the same object, then they ought to have the same contribution
to the truth of ϕ.
Theorem 2 (Agreement of Models and their Enrichments). Let m1
be a model for L1, and let m2 be an enrichment of m1 to L2. If ϕ is a formula
in L1 (and therefore, also in L2), then: m1 |= ϕ ⇐⇒ m2 |= ϕ.
The following theorem shows that the reliance on cL in the deﬁnition of
truth in a model is not necessary; in order to deﬁne the truth-conditions of
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a quantiﬁed formula ϕ, we could use any SRE of L that does not occur in ϕ.
The notion of σ(P )-enrichment can be replaced by that of σ(P )-change:
Definition 21 (A-s-Change). Let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model for a language
L, let s be an SRE in L, and let A ⊆ M . A model m′ = 〈M ′, σ′〉 for L is an
A-s-change of m if the following conditions hold:
1. M ′ = M .
2. σ′(s) ∈ A.
3. For any α ∈ dom (σ)\{s}, σ′(α) = σ(α).
Note: In order to fully determine an A-s-change m′ of m, it is suﬃcient to
choose any α ∈ A, and deﬁne σ′(s) to be α .
Theorem 3 (Truth-conditions of Quantified Formulas). Let ϕ(qP ) be
a formula in a language L, and assume that an occurrence t of qP is the
main QNP in ϕ. Let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model for L, and let s be an SRE not
occurring in ϕ.
1. If q is every, then: m |= ϕ(every P ) iﬀ: for every σ(P )-s-change m′ of
m, m′ |= ϕ[t/s].
2. If q is some, then: m |= ϕ(some P ) iﬀ: for some σ(P )-s-change m′ of
m, m′ |= ϕ[t/s].
The following two theorems follow immediately from lemma 1 and theo-
rem 2, respectively.
Theorem 4 (Interchangeability of Identicals). Let ϕ be a formula in a
language L, and let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model for L. Assume that ϕ contains
the occurrences c1, . . . , cn of an SRE s (and maybe some other occurrences of
that SRE as well). If m |= ϕ and m |= [s is s′], then m |= ϕ[c1/s′, . . . , cn/s′].
Theorem 5 (Agreement of Models and Their A-s-changes). Let m
be a model for a language L, let A ⊆ M , and let m′ be an A-s-change of m.
If ϕ is a formula (in L) that does not contain s, then: m′ |= ϕ ⇐⇒ m |= ϕ.
The following lemma says, roughly, that any proof can be replaced by a
proof in which no premise appears twice.
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Lemma 2. Let D be a proof in our system, and assume that the last line in
D is 〈α(n)ϕJ〉. Then there exists a proof D′ of ϕ from TD(α) in which no
premise appears more than once (i.e. if 〈i(i)ψ Premise〉 and 〈j(j)ψ Premise〉
are both lines of D′ , then i = j). Moreover, we can assume that for any line
〈β(i)ψJi〉 in D, there exists a line 〈β′(i′)ψJ ′i〉 in D′ such that TD(β) = T ′D(β′).
This lemma follows from the following fact: whenever one of our inference
rules allows us to rely on a given premise, it places no restriction on the place
(the line-number) of that premise in the proof. Therefore, the need to write
a premise that already appears in the proof never arises.
Lemma 3 (Concatenation of Proofs). Let D1, D2 be proofs in a language
L, and assume that D2 does not contain the same premise twice. Assume
that the last line of D1 is 〈β(k)ψJ〉. Also assume that the last line of D2 is
〈α(n)ϕJ ′〉, where TD2(α) ⊆ {ψ} (that is: D2 is a proof of ϕ from ψ, which
is the formula in the last line of D1). Then, there exists a proof D in L such
that:
1. The ﬁrst #D1 lines of D are exactly those of D1, in the same order.
2. The last line of D is 〈β′(m)ϕJ ′′〉, where β′ = β if TD2(α) = {ψ} (i.e.
if the last line of D2 indeed relied on ψ) and β
′ = ∅ if TD2(α) = ∅ (i.e.
if D2 is a proof of ϕ from ∅).
D is called the concatenation of D1 and D2, and we write: D = (D1, D2).
We shall not give a precise proof of this lemma. The idea is the following:
we start with D1, and apply to it the rules applied in D2, one by one. If, in
doing that, if we have to rely on ψ, we rely on the last line of D2.
Lemma 4. Let ψ, ψ′ be formulas in a language L. If ψ′  ψ, then there exists
a proof D that has a last line of the form 〈α(n)ψJ〉, where TD(α) = ψ′.
The following lemma asserts that we can replace a premise in a proof
with a stronger premise, without signiﬁcantly changing the rest of the proof.
Lemma 5. Let D be a proof in our system, and assume that no premise
appears in D twice. Also assume that D includes the line: 〈i(i)ψ Premise 〉.
Let ψ′ be a formula such that ψ′  ψ. Then there exists a proof D′ such that:
1. For any j < i, the j-th lines of D and D′ are identical.
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2. The i-th line of D′ is 〈i(i)ψ′ Premise 〉.
3. D′ includes a line of the form 〈i(k)ψJk〉.
4. For any j > i, if D includes the line 〈α(j)ϕJ〉, then D′ includes a line
〈α′(j′)ϕJ ′〉, where TD′(α′) = TD(α) up to the replacement of ψ with ψ′
(that is: in case ψ ∈ TD(α), we do not have the above equality, but
instead: TD′(α
′) = (TD(α)\{ψ})∪{ψ′}. Otherwise – we have equality).
A line that stands in the above relation to 〈α(j)ϕJ〉 will be called a
twin of 〈α(j)ϕJ〉.
This lemma can be proved by induction on #D. We shall not give such
a proof here.
Theorem 6 (Provability of Theories is Transitive). Let T1, T2, T3 be
theories in a language L. If T1  T2 and T2  T3, then T1  T3.
This theorem follows from the fact that any proof uses only a ﬁnite num-
ber of premises, and from the following three lemmas, that hold for any ϕi,
ψi and ϕ, and can be proved using our previous results:
1. If ϕ1  ϕ2 and ϕ2  ϕ3, then ϕ1  ϕ3.
2. ϕ1, . . . , ϕn  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn  ϕ.
3. If ϕ1  ψ1, ϕ2  ψ2, . . . , ϕn  ψn, then: ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn  ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψn.
5.2 Soundness
Theorem 7 (Soundness). Let T be a Theory in a language L, and let ϕ
be a formula in L. If T  ϕ, then T |= ϕ.
Proof: To prove the theorem, it is convenient to prove the following propo-
sition by induction on n: let D be a proof of length n. If the last line in D
is 〈α(n)ϕJ〉, then TD(α) |= ϕ.
The induction base is trivial. Assume now that the proposition holds for
any k < n. To complete the proof, we need to check each of the possibilities
for the justiﬁcation of the n-th line in D , and prove that TD(α) |= ϕ in each
of them. We give the case of some E as an example.
If the last line is justiﬁed by some E, then D includes lines of the forms
〈α(i)ψ(some P )J〉; 〈j(j)s is P Premise 〉; 〈k(k)ψ[t/s] Premise 〉; 〈β(l)δJl〉,
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where: ψ(some P ) is a formula in which an occurrence t of some P is the
main QNP; neither ψ(some P ) nor δ contains s; j, k ∈ α; β does not contain
any number, other than j and k, of a line in which s occurs. Also, the
last line in D is 〈(α ∪ β)\{j, k}(n)δ some E, i, j, k, l〉. Let m be a model
of TD((α ∪ β)\{j, k}). We shall prove that m |= δ. Since j, k ∈ α, we
have TD(α) ⊆ TD((α ∪ β)\{j, k}). Therefore: m |= TD(α), and by the
induction hypothesis: m |= ψ(some P ). Since ψ does not contain s, it
follows, by theorem 3, that there exists a σ(P )-s-change m′ of m such that
m′ |= ψ[t/s]. m′, as a σ(P )-s-change, also satisﬁes s is P . That is: m′
satisﬁes the formulas in lines j and k, or, in other words: m′ |= TD({i, j}).
Now, since TD(β\{j, k}) ⊆ TD((α ∪ β)\{j, k}), we have: m |= TD(β\{i, j}).
And since none of the formulas in TD(β\{i, j}) contains s ( β does not contain
any number, other than j and k, of a line in which s occurs), we have:
m′ |= TD(β\{i, j}) (this follows from m |= TD(β\{i, j}), by theorem 5).
Therefore: m′ |= TD(β). From the induction hypothesis it now follows that
m′ |= δ. And since δ does not contain s, it follows (by theorem 5) that
m |= δ.

5.3 The version of FOL that will be used below
We shall use a version of FOL with identity, without function signs, and
without open formulas. The version of FOL to be deﬁned and used below
can be proved to be equivalent to standard versions found in the literature.
This section contains the deﬁnitions of the relevant terms. Most of these
terms were also used in deﬁning our formal system. When we use a term
below, we shall take care to specify, in cases where confusion might arise,
whether it refers to FOL or to our system.
Definition 22 (Formal Language). A formal language L is a disjoint
union of eight sets: P – a set of one-place predicates; R – a set of relation-
signs or many-place predicates (to every one of which we assign a natural
number n > 1, called its number of places); {=} – the identity sign; S
– a denumerable set of individual constants; {x1, x2, . . .} – a denumerable
set of variables; {¬,∧,∨,−→} – connectives; {∀,∃} – quantiﬁers; {), (} –
parenthesis.
Note: We use the notation ϕ[α/β] for FOL in the same way we use it for
our system.
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Definition 23 (Formula).
1. Any string of the form: Rs1 . . . sn or: s1 = s2, where s1, . . . , sn are
individual constants, and R – an n-place predicate, is a formula. Strings
of these forms are also called atomic formulas.
2. If α, β are formulas, then so are ¬(α), (α)∧(β), (α)∨(β), (α) −→ (β).
3. If ψ is a formula that contains an individual constant s and x is a
variable that does not occur in ψ, then ∀x(ψ[s/x]) and ∃x(ψ[s/x]) are
formulas.
4. Nothing else is a formula.
Note: When referring to formulas, we shall sometimes omit parenthesis, for
the sake of convenience.
The deﬁnition of truth in a model that will be used below is close to the
one we use in our system. We begin by introducing the notion of character-
istic constant:
Definition 24 (Characteristic Constant). For every Language L, let cL
be a new sign, not in L. L∗ is deﬁned as the language L ∪ {cL}, in which cL
is an individual constant. cL is the characteristic constant of L.
Definition 25 (Model). Let L be a formal language. A model for L is an
ordered pair m = 〈M,σ〉 such that: M , the universe of m, is a non-empty
set; σ, the interpretation function, is a function such that:
1. The domain of σ is the set of all constants and predicates of L.
2. If s is a constant, then σ(s) ∈ M .
3. If R is an n-place predicate, then σ(R) ⊆ Mn.
Enrichment and restriction of a model are deﬁned as in our system (def-
inition 10 above).
Definition 26 (Truth in a Model). 1. If s1, . . . , sn are individual con-
stants and R an n-place predicate in a language L, and m = 〈M,σ〉
– a model for L, then: m |= [Rs1 . . . sn] iﬀ 〈σ(s1), . . . , σ(sn)〉 ∈ σ(R);
m |= [s1 = s2] iﬀ σ(s1) = σ(s2).
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2. If α and β are formulas in a language L, and m = 〈M,σ〉 – a model
for L, then: m |= ¬α iﬀ m |= α ; m |= [α ∧ β] iﬀ m |= α and m |= β;
m |= [α ∨ β] iﬀ m |= α or m |= β; m |= [α −→ β] iﬀ m |= α and
m |= β.
3. Let ψ be a formula in a language L, and let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model
for L, assume that ψ contains the individual constant s and does not
contain the variable x. Then: m |= ∀x(ψ[s/x]) iﬀ m′ |= ψ[s/cL] for
every enrichment m′ of m to L∗; m |= ∃x(ψ[s/x]) iﬀ m′ |= ψ[s/cL] for
at least one enrichment m′ of m to L∗.
In section 5.1, we explained that the truth-conditions of quantiﬁed for-
mulas in the system we deﬁned can be determined without reference to cL
(by what we called A-s-changes). A similar theorem holds for FOL. First,
we deﬁne:
Definition 27 (s-Change). Let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model for a language L
in FOL, let s be an individual constant in L. A model m′ = 〈M ′, σ′〉 for L
is an s-change of m if the following conditions hold:
1. M ′ = M .
2. For any α ∈ dom (σ)\{s}, σ′(α) = σ(α).
Note: In order to fully determine an s-change m′ of m, it is suﬃcient to
choose any β ∈ M , and deﬁne σ′(s) to be β.
Theorem 8 (Truth-conditions of Quantified Formulas). Let qxϕ[s/x]
be a formula in a language L in FOL. Let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model for L, and
let s be an SRE not occurring in ϕ.
1. If q is ∀, then: m |= ∀xϕ(x) iﬀ:
for every s-change m′ of m, m′ |= ϕ[x/s].
2. If q is ∃, then: m |= ∃xϕ(x) iﬀ:
for some s-change m′ of m, m′ |= ϕ[x/s].
We shall not prove this theorem here.
Definition 28 (Theory). A Theory in a language L in FOL is a set of
formulas in L.
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Model of a theory and entailment are deﬁned as in section 2.3 above
(deﬁnitions 15, 16).
Definition 29 (Proof). Let L be a formal language. A proof in L is a ﬁnite
sequence of 4-tuples of the form 〈α, (k), ϕ, J〉, called the lines of the proof,
where:
a. α is a ﬁnite (possibly empty) set of natural numbers, all of which are
smaller than or equal to k. Lines 〈α′, (k′), ϕ′, J ′〉 in the proof for which
k′ ∈ α will be called the lines on which the k-th line relies. The formulas
ϕ′ in such lines will be called the formulas on which the k-th line relies.
b. k, the line’s number, is a natural number. The ﬁrst line in a proof has
k = 1, the second – k = 2, etc.
c. ϕ is a formula in L.
d. J , the justiﬁcation of the k-th line, is written in accordance with one
of the following rules.
29.1 Premise. If ϕ is a formula in L, then 〈1(1)ϕ Premise〉 is a proof.
Also, if D is a proof of length k − 1, then we may add to D the
line: 〈k(k)ϕ Premise〉.
29.2 Identity Introduction. If s is an individual constant, then
〈(1)s = s Id I〉 is a proof. Also, if D is a proof of length k − 1,
then we may add to it the line 〈(k)s = s Id I〉.
29.3 Identity Elimination. Let D be a proof of length k−1. Assume
that s and s′ are individual constants, and that D includes the
line 〈α(i)s = s′Ji〉. Assume also that D includes a line 〈β(j)ϕJj〉,
where ϕ contains the occurrences c1, . . . , cn of s (and maybe other
occurrences of s as well). Then, we may add to D the line
〈α ∪ β(k)ϕ[c1/s′, . . . , cn/s′] Id E, i, j〉.
29.4 Propositional Calculus Rules. We allow the usual introduc-
tion and elimination rules for each connective. (The rules are sim-
ilar to the ones we formulated for formulas with no SRE-anaphors
in our system.)
29.5 ∀ Introduction. Let D be a proof of length k − 1, and assume
that D includes the line 〈α(i)ψ(s)J〉, where s is an individual
204 A FORMAL SYSTEM WITH PLURAL REFERENCE
constant and ψ does not contain the variable x. Assume also that
α does not contain any number of a line in which s occurs. Then,
we may add to D the line 〈α(k)∀x(ψ[s/x])∀ I, i〉.
29.6 ∀ Elimination. Let D be a proof of length k − 1, and assume
that D includes the line 〈α(i)∀x(ψ[s′/x])J〉, where ψ is a formula
containing an individual constant s′. If s is an individual constant,
then we may add to D the line 〈α(k)ψ[s′/s]∀ E, i〉.
29.7 ∃ Introduction. Let D be a proof of length k − 1, and assume
that D includes the line 〈α(i)ψ[s′/s]J〉, where s and s′ are indi-
vidual constants, and ψ does not contain the variable x. Then, we
may add to D the line 〈α(k)∃x(ψ[s′/x])∃ I, i〉.
29.8 ∃ Elimination. Let D be a proof of length k − 1, and assume
that D includes the lines 〈α(i)∃x(ψ[s/x])Ji〉; 〈j(j)ψ(s) Premise〉;
〈β(k)δJk〉. Assume also that j ∈ α, that δ does not contain s,
and that β does not contain any number, other than j, of a line
in which s occurs. Then we may add to D the line
〈(α ∪ β)\{j}(m)δ ∃ E, i, j, k〉.
Provability is deﬁned as in our system (section 2.4 above); we also use
the notation TD(α) as deﬁned there.
We state the following two theorems without proof:
Theorem 9 (Soundness and Completeness of FOL). Let L be a formal
language in FOL. Let T be a theory in L and ϕ a formula in L. Then:
T |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T  ϕ.
5.4 Translation from FOL to our system
Definition 30 (Correlate of a Formal Language). Let L be a formal lan-
guage in our system. The correlate of L in FOL, Lπ, is the formal language
that satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. The individual constants of Lπ are the SREs of L.
2. (a) The predicates of Lπ are those of L, excluding Thing.
(b) If a predicate is n-place in L, then it is n-place in Lπ.
Note: Given a language L, there is exactly one language Lπ that satisﬁes
the above conditions.
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Definition 31 (Translation of Formulas). Let L be a formal language in
our system, and let ϕ be a formula in Lπ (in FOL). The translation µ of
formulas from Lπ to L is deﬁned by induction on formulas in Lπ. First, we
arrange the variables of Lπ in an inﬁnite list, in which each variable appears
inﬁnitely many times. (This list will enable us to make µ injective. It will be
used in theorem 10 below.) Now:
1. The translation of atomic formulas is deﬁned as follows:
(a) If ϕ is s1 = s2, where s1 and s2 are individual constants, then
µ(ϕ) is s1 is s2.
(b) Let R be an n-place predicate ( n ≥ 1) in Lπ. If ϕ is Rs1 . . . sn,
then µ(ϕ) is (s1, . . . , sn) is R.
2. If α, β are formulas in Lπ, then: µ(¬α) is ¬µ(α); µ(α ∧ β) is µ(α) ∧
µ(β); µ(α ∨ β) is µ(α) ∨ µ(β); µ(α −→ β) is µ(α) −→ µ(β).
3. If ϕ(s) is a formula that contains an individual constant s, and x a
variable that does not occur in ϕ, then:
(a) µ(∀xϕ[s/x]) is ((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ (µ(ϕ)[s/(l)a]), where
l is the least index not occurring in µ(ϕ) such that x is on the l-th
place in the above mentioned list.
(b) µ(∃xϕ[s/x]) is ((l) some Thing is Thing) ∧ (µ(ϕ)[s/(l)a]), where
l is as above.
Theorem 10 (The Translation µ is Injective). Let L be a formal lan-
guage in our system, and let ϕ be a formula in Lπ. If ψ is a formula (in Lπ)
such that µ(ψ) = µ(ϕ), then ψ is ϕ.
To see that the theorem is true, we note that in each of the stages in the
deﬁnition of µ , µ(ϕ) determines ϕ. A precise proof can be given by induction
on #ϕ.
Theorem 11 (µ(ϕ) Does Not Contain SRE-Anaphors). If ϕ is a for-
mula in Lπ, then µ(ϕ) does not contain anaphors of SRE occurrences.
The theorem is not hard to prove by induction on formulas in Lπ.
As we already mentioned, universal quantiﬁcation in FOL lacks existential
import. Therefore, in order for the translations of formulas to be equivalent
to the formulas they translate, we need to complement FOL with axioms of
existential import. We deﬁne:
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Definition 32 (EI ). Let L be a formal language in our system. Then EI(Lπ)
(in short: EI) is the set of all formulas in Lπ that have the form: ∃xPx, where
x is a variable and P is a one-place predicate.
Theorem 12 (µ(EI) is Provable). Let L be a formal language in our sys-
tem. If T is a theory in L, then T  µ(EI).
Proof: It is suﬃcient to prove that ∅  µ(EI). Let ϕ ∈ EI. Then ϕ is of
the form ∃xPx, and µ(ϕ) is: ((l) some Thing is Thing )∧((l)a is P ). That
this formula is provable from ∅ follows from the existence of the following
proof:
1 (1) s is P Premise
(2) every P is P every I, 1, 1
(3) some P is P RI, 2
(4) d is Thing Th I
5 (5) d is P Premise
5 (6) (d is Thing ) ∧ (d is P ) ∧ I, 4, 5
5 (7) ((l)d is Thing ) ∧ ((l)a is P ) A I, 6
5 (8) ((l)some Thing is Thing ) ∧ ((l)a is P ) some I, 4, 7
(9) ((l)some Thing is Thing ) ∧ ((l)a is P ) some E, 3, 5, 5, 8

Definition 33 (Correlate of a Model). Let L be a formal language in our
system, and let m = 〈M,σ〉 be a model of EI(Lπ). The correlate of m in our
system, µ(m), is the model for L deﬁned by: µ(m) = 〈M,µσ〉, where:
1. For any individual constant s in L, µσ(s) = σ(s).
2. µσ(Thing) = M .
3. For any other n-place predicate R in L (n ≥ 1), µσ(R) = σ(R).
Note: The above deﬁnition indeed determines a model for L; the require-
ment that σ(P ) = ∅ for all one-place predicates is fulﬁlled since m is a model
of EI .
Theorem 13 (The Restriction of µ to Models is a Bijection). Let L
be a formal language in our system. Let A be the set of all models of EI(Lπ),
and let B be the set of all models for L. Then, the restriction of µ to A is a
bijection from A to B.
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Proof: µ|A is injective: if m1 = 〈M1, σ1〉, m2 = 〈M2, σ2〉 are models of
EI such that µ(m1) = µ(m2), then σ1(Thing) = M1 = M2 = σ2(Thing),
and also: σ1(α) = µσ1(α) = µσ2(α) = σ2(α) for any predicate or individual
constant α in L\{Thing}. Therefore: m1 = m2.
µ|A is onto B: if m = 〈M,σ〉 is a model for L, then µ(m′) = m, where
m′ = 〈M ′, σ′〉 is the model for Lπ determined by: M ′ = M ; σ′(α) = σ(α) for
all predicates and individual constants α in Lπ.

Theorem 14 (Truth under µ). Let L be a formal language in our system,
and let ϕ be a formula in Lπ. If m = 〈M,σ〉 is a model of EI(Lπ), then:
m |= ϕ ⇐⇒ µ(m) |= µ(ϕ).
Proof: By induction on formulas in Lπ.
1. Atomic formulas: m |= [s1 = s2] ⇐⇒ σ(s1) = σ(s2) ⇐⇒ µσ(s1) =
µσ(s2) ⇐⇒ µ(m) |= [s1 is s2] ⇐⇒ µ(m) |= µ(s1 = s2).
m |= [Rs1 . . . sn] ⇐⇒ 〈σ(s1), . . . , σ(sn)〉 ∈ σ(R) ⇐⇒
〈µσ(s1), . . . , µσ(sn)〉 ∈ µσ(R) ⇐⇒ µ(m) |= [(s1, . . . , sn) is R] ⇐⇒
µ(m) |= µ(Rs1 . . . sn)
2. If the theorem holds for α and β, then:
m |= [α ∧ β] ⇐⇒ m |= α and m |= β ⇐⇒ µ(m) |= µ(α) and
µ(m) |= µ(β) ⇐⇒ (since µ(α), µ(β) do not contain anaphors of SRE
occurrences) µ(m) |= [µ(α) ∧ µ(β)] ⇐⇒ µ(m) |= µ(α ∧ β).
The proofs for ¬α, α ∨ β and α −→ β are similar.
3. If ϕ(s) is a formula that contains an individual constant s, and x a
variable that does not occur in ϕ, then:
m |= ∀xϕ[s/x] ⇐⇒ every s-change m′ of m satisﬁes ϕ(s) ⇐⇒ (by the
induction hypothesis) for every s-change m′ of m, µ(m′) |= µ(ϕ(s))
⇐⇒ (since the set of σ(Thing)-s-changes of µ(m) is {µ(m′)}|m′ is an
s-change of m) for every σ(Thing)-s-change (µ(m))′ of µ(m),
(µ(m))′ |= µ(ϕ(s)) ⇐⇒ for every σ(Thing)-s-change (µ(m))′ of µ(m),
(µ(m))′ |= [(s is Thing) ∧ µ(ϕ(s))] ⇐⇒ for every σ(Thing)-s-change
(µ(m))′ of µ(m), (µ(m))′ |= [((l)s is Thing) ∧ µ(ϕ)[s/(l)a]] ⇐⇒
µ(m) |= [((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ µ(ϕ)[s/(l)a]] ⇐⇒
µ(m) |= µ(∀xϕ[s/x])
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4. The proof for ∃xϕ[s/x] is similar.

Theorem 15 (Entailment under µ). Let L be a formal language (in our
system), let T be a theory in Lπ, and let ϕ be a formula in Lπ. If µ(T ) |=
µ(ϕ), then T ∪ EI |= ϕ.
Proof: Assume that µ(T ) |= µ(ϕ). Let m be a model for T ∪ EI. m is a
model of EI that satisﬁes T . Therefore, by theorem 14: µ(m) |= µ(T ), and
it follows that µ(m) |= µ(ϕ). Now, by theorem 14, it follows that m |= ϕ.
Therefore: T ∪ EI |= ϕ.

Theorem 16 (Provability under µ). Let ϕ be a formula in a language
Lπ, and let T be a theory in Lπ. If T  ϕ, then µ(T )  µ(ϕ).
Proof: The idea behind the proof is the following: given a proof in FOL,
our inference rules enable us to reconstruct it in our system.
In order to prove the theorem precisely, we prove the following proposition
by induction on n: Let D be a proof of length n in Lπ. If the last line in D
is 〈α(n)ϕJn〉, then µ(TD(α))  µ(ϕ).
1. If n = 1, then α is either {n} or ∅, and the justiﬁcation Jn is either
Premise, or Id I respectively. In either case, one application of Premise
or Id I proves µ(ϕ) from µ(TD(α)).
2. Assume that the above proposition is true for any k < n.
(a) If the last line of D is justiﬁed by Premise or Id I, then the proof
is as above.
(b) If the last line of D is justiﬁed by −→ Introduction, then D con-
tains the lines 〈i(i)ψ1 Premise〉; 〈β(j)ψ2Jj〉, and the last line in
D is 〈β\{i}(n)ψ1 −→ ψ2 −→ I, i, j〉. We shall show that
µ(TD(β\{i}))  µ(ψ1 −→ ψ2). By the induction hypothesis,
µ(TD(β))  µ(ψ2). Therefore, there exists a proof D′, in our
system, the last line of which is 〈γ(k)µ(ψ2)J〉, where TD′(γ) ⊆
µ(TD(β)).
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Now, if D′ includes a line of the form 〈i(i)µ(ψ1) Premise〉, we can
proceed as follows: we can assume that no formula appears in D′
as a premise in two diﬀerent lines (see lemma 2). We can now add
to D′ the line 〈γ\{i}(k + 1)µ(ψ1) −→ µ(ψ2) −→ I, i, k〉.3 Since
µ(ψ1) does not appear in D
′ as a primise in any line other than
i, we have: µ(ψ1) ∈ µ(TD′(γ\{i})). And since TD′(γ) ⊆ µ(TD(β))
and line i of D is 〈i(i)ψ1 Premise〉, it follows that TD′(γ\{i}) ⊆
µ(TD(β\{i})). Therefore: µ(TD(β\{i}))  [µ(ψ1) −→ µ(ψ2)]. In
other words: µ(TD(β\{i}))  µ(ψ1 −→ ψ2), as we wanted to
prove.
In case D′ does not include a line of the form 〈i(i)µ(ψ1) Premise〉,
we have µ(ψ1) ∈ µ(TD′(γ)), and therefore TD′(γ) ⊆ µ(TD(β\{i})).
It follows that: µ(TD(β\{i}))  µ(ψ2), and hence: µ(TD(β\{i})) 
[µ(ψ1) −→ µ(ψ2)]. That is: µ(TD(β\{i}))  µ(ψ1 −→ ψ2).
The proofs for the cases in which the last line of D is justiﬁed
by some other propositional calculus derivation rule are similar to
the one above, and will not be detailed here.
(c) If the last line of D is justiﬁed by ∀ Introduction, then D in-
cludes a line of the form 〈α(i)ψ(s)Ji〉, where s is an individual
constant, ψ does not contain the variable x, and α does not con-
tain any number of a line in which s occurs. Also, the last line
in D is 〈α(n)∀x(ψ[s/x])∀ I, i〉. We shall prove that µ(TD(α)) 
µ(∀x(ψ[s/x])) or, in other words, that:
µ(TD(α))  [((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]].
We should note that since α does not contain numbers of lines in
which s occurs, none of the formulas in TD(α) contains s. And
since for any formula δ, µ(δ) contains exactly the same SREs/in-
dividual constants as δ does (this is easily proved by induction on
formulas in Lπ), none of the formulas in µ(TD(α)) contains s.
By the induction hypothesis, µ(TD(α))  µ(ψ(s)). Therefore,
there exists a proof D′, in our system, the last line of which is
〈γ(k)µ(ψ)J〉, where TD′(γ) ⊆ µ(TD(α)). It will be suﬃcient to
prove that TD′(γ)  [((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]].
To prove this, we add to D′ the following lines:
3The −→ Introduction rule requires that the formulas involved will not contain
anaphors of SRE occurrences. This condition is fulﬁlled, since no µ(ψ) contains such
anaphors (see theorem 10).
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k + 1 (k + 1) s is Thing Premise
γ ∪ {k + 1} (k + 2) (s is Thing ) ∧ µ(ψ) ∧ I, k, k + 1
γ ∪ {k + 1} (k + 3) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a] A I, k + 2
γ (k + 4) ((l)every Thing is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]
every I, k + 1, k + 3
(The every Introduction rule requires that γ ∪ {k + 1} will not
contain any number, other than k+1, of a line in which s occurs.
This requirement is fulﬁlled here, since TD′(γ) ⊆ µ(TD(α)) and
none of the formulas in µ(TD(α)) contains s.)
The proof that results from the addition of the above lines to D′
is a proof of µ(∀x(ψ[s/x])) from µ(TD(α)).
(d) If the last line of proof D is justiﬁed by ∀ Elimination, then D
includes a line 〈α(i)∀x(ψ[s′/x])Ji〉 , and the last line in D is
〈α(n)ψ[s′/s]∀ E, i〉. We shall prove that µ(TD(α))  µ(ψ[s′/s]).
By the induction hypothesis: µ(TD(α))  µ(∀x(ψ[s′/x])). That is:
µ(TD(α))  [((l) every Thing is Thing ) ∧ µ(ψ)[s′/(l)a]].
Therefore, there exists a proof D′, whose last line is:
〈γ(k)((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s′/(l)a]J〉, such that
TD′(γ) ⊆ µ(TD(α)).
We can add to D′ the following lines:
(k + 1) s is Thing Th I
γ (k + 2) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s′/(l)a] every E, k, k + 1
γ (k + 3) (s is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s′/s] A E, k + 2
γ (k + 4) µ(ψ)[s′/s] ∧ E, k + 3
The proof we got shows that µ(TD(α))  µ(ψ)[s′/s]. Now, since
µ(ψ)[s′/s] is in fact µ(ψ[s′/s]) (this can by proved by induction
on formulas in Lπ), we have: µ(TD(α))  µ(ψ[s′/s]), as required.
(e) If the last line of D is justiﬁed by ∃ introduction, then D includes
a line: 〈α(i)ψ[s′/s]Ji〉, and its last line is 〈α(n)∃x(ψ[s′/x])∃ I, i〉.
We shall prove that µ(TD(α))  µ(∃x(ψ[s′/x])). By the induc-
tion hypothesis: µ(TD(α))  µ(ψ[s′/s]). Therefore, there ex-
ists a proof D′, whose last line is: 〈γ(k)µ(ψ[s′/s])J〉, such that
TD′(γ) ⊆ µ(TD(α)).
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We now add to D′ the following lines:
(k + 1) s is Thing Th I
γ (k + 2) (s is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ[s′/s]) ∧ I, k, k + 1
The formula in the last line above is, in fact: (s is Thing) ∧
(µ(ψ)[s′/s]). We can therefore add the following lines:
γ (k + 3) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ (µ(ψ)[s′/(l)a]) A I, k + 2
γ (k + 4) ((l) some Thing is Thing) ∧ (µ(ψ)[s′/(l)a])
some I, k + 1, k + 3
The proof we thus get is a proof of µ(∃x(ψ[s′/x])) from µ(TD(α)).
(f) If the last line of D is justiﬁed by ∃ Elimination, then D in-
cludes lines of the forms: 〈α(i)∃x(ψ[s/x])Ji〉; 〈j(j)ψ(s) Premise〉;
〈β(k)δJk〉, where j ∈ α, δ does not contain s, and β does not
contain any number, other than j, of a line in which s occurs.
The last line in D is 〈(α ∪ β)\{j}(n)δ∃ E, i, j, k〉. We shall prove
that µ(TD((α ∪ β)\{j}))  µ(δ). By the induction hypothesis:
µ(TD(α))  µ(∃x(ψ[s/x])), that is: µ(TD(α))  ((l) some Thing
is Thing) ∧ (µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]), and also: µ(TD(β))  µ(δ). If TD(α)
contains ψ(s), then, since j ∈ α, α contains some other number
j′ of a line in D, in which ψ(s) appears as a premise. There-
fore, if we omit j from α ∪ β, TD(α ∪ β) will remain unchanged.
That is: TD((α ∪ β)\{j}) = TD(α ∪ β). And since µ(δ) is prov-
able from µ(TD(β)), which is a subset of TD(α ∪ β), we have:
TD((α ∪ β)\{j}) = TD(α ∪ β)  µ(δ), as required.
Assume now that ψ(s) ∈ TD(α). Since: µ(TD(α))  [((l) some
Thing is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]], and: µ(TD(β))  µ(δ), there ex-
ists a proof D′, whose last two lines are:
γ1 (k) ((l) some Thing is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a] J1
γ2 (k + 1) µ(δ) J2
where TD′(γ1) ⊆ µ(TD(α)) and TD′(γ2) ⊆ µ(TD(β)).4
4To construct such a proof, we can start with a proof of µ(δ) from µ(TD(β)), and
‘insert’, so to speak, a proof of ((l) some Thing is Thing)∧ (µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]) from µ(TD(α))
between the last line of the proof we started with and the rest of that proof.
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If µ(ψ) ∈ TD′(γ2), then the above proof shows that TD′(γ2)\{µ(ψ)}
= TD′(γ2)  µ(δ). We also have:
TD′(γ2)\{µ(ψ)} ⊆ µ(TD(β))\{µ(ψ)} ⊆
µ(TD(β\{j})) ⊆ µ(TD((α ∪ β)\{j})).
Therefore: µ(TD((α ∪ β)\{j}))  µ(δ), as required.
Assume that µ(ψ) ∈ TD′(γ2). Then, D′ contains a line of the form
〈m(m)µ(ψ(s)) Premise〉 (it is not hard to show that every line in a
proof, on which another line relies, is a premise). Since TD′(γ2) ⊆
µ(TD(β)), TD′(γ2) contains no formula, other than µ(ψ), in which
s occurs. Also, since TD′(γ1) ⊆ µ(TD(α)), ψ(s) ∈ TD(α), and µ is
injective (theorem 10) we have: µ(ψ(s)) ∈ TD′(γ1). We proceed
as follows: By lemma 2, we can assume that no premise appears
in D′ twice. By lemma 5, since [((l)s is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]] 
µ(ψ(s)),5 there is a proof D′′ that includes lines of the forms:
m (m) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a] Premise
γ′1 (p) ((l) some Thing is Thing) ∧ (µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]) J ′1
γ′2 (q) µ(δ) J
′
2
where TD′′(γ
′
1) and TD′′(γ
′
2) are identical with TD′(γ1) and TD′(γ2)
(respectively) up to the replacement of µ(ψ) by ((l) some Thing
is Thing) ∧ (µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]). By lemma 2, we can assume that D′′
does not contain the same premise twice. γ′2 does not contain any
number, other than m, of a line in which s occurs.6 Also, γ′1 does
not contain m.7 We now add to D′′ the following lines:
q + 1 (q + 1) s is Thing Premise
(γ′1 ∪ γ′2)\{q + 1,m} (q + 2) µ(δ) some E, p,m, q + 1, q
Call the resulting proof D′′′. We have TD′′′((γ′1∪γ′2)\{q+1,m}) 
µ(δ). It is now suﬃcient to show that TD′′′((γ
′
1∪γ′2)\{q+1,m}) ⊆
5The proof requires one application of AE, and one application of ∧ E.
6TD′(γ2) contains no formula, other than µ(ψ), in which s occurs. And given the rela-
tion between TD′′(γ′2) and TD′(γ2), it follows that TD′′(γ
′
2) does not contain any formula,
other than ((l)s is Thing)∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a], in which s occurs. And that formula appears as
a premise in D′′ only in line m.
7TD′′(γ′1) is identical with TD′(γ1) up to the replacement of µ(ψ) by
((l) some Thing is Thing) ∧ (µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]). And TD′(γ1) did not contain µ(ψ).
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µ(TD((α∪ β)\{j})). Assume that χ ∈ TD′′′((γ′1 ∪ γ′2)\{q +1,m}).
Then χ ∈ TD′′′(γ′1∪γ′2) = TD′′(γ′1∪γ′2) = TD′′(γ′1)∪TD′′(γ′2). Also,
since χ ∈ TD′′′({q + 1,m}), χ = ((l)s is Thing) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a].
Therefore:
χ ∈ (TD′′(γ′1) ∪ TD′′(γ′2))\{((l)s is Thing ) ∧ µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]}. And
since TD′′(γ
′
1) and TD′′(γ
′
2) are identical to TD′(γ1) and TD′(γ2)
up to the replacement of µ(ψ) by ((l) some Thing is Thing) ∧
(µ(ψ)[s/(l)a]), it follows that χ ∈ (TD′(γ1) ∪ TD′(γ2))\{µ(ψ)} ⊆
[µ(TD(α)) ∪ µ(TD(β))]\{µ(ψ)} = µ(TD(α) ∪ TD(β))\{µ(ψ)} =
µ(TD(α ∪ β))\{µ(ψ)} ⊆ µ(TD((α ∪ β)\{j})).
Therefore, we have
TD′′′((γ
′
1 ∪ γ′2)\{k + 2,m}) ⊆ µ(TD((α ∪ β)\{j})), as required.

5.5 Paraphrases
In this section we show that every formula ϕ in our system is both seman-
tically and deductively equivalent to a formula ϕ∗, which is the translation
of some formula ϕπ of FOL. We ﬁrst correlate, with each formula, a set of
paraphrases:
Definition 34 (Paraphrases). Let L be a formal language in our system,
and let ϕ be a formula in L. The paraphrases of ϕ are deﬁned by induction
on formulas:
1. Atomic formulas: if s1, . . . , sn are SREs and R is an n-place pred-
icate (n ≥ 1), then: the only paraphrase of s1 is s2 is itself; The
only paraphrase of s1 isn’t s2 is: ¬(s1 is s2); the only paraphrase of
(s1, . . . , sn) is R is itself; the only paraphrase of (s1, . . . , sn) isn’t R is:
¬((s1, . . . , sn) is R).
2. If α and β are formulas that do not contain anaphors of SRE occur-
rences, then: the paraphrases of ¬α are all the formulas of the form
¬(α′), where α′ is a paraphrase of α. Similarly, the paraphrases of
α ∧ β are the formulas of the form α′ ∧ β′ (where α′ and β′ are para-
phrases of α and β respectively); those of α∨ β are the formulas of the
form α′ ∨ β′; and those of α −→ β are the formulas α′ −→ β′.
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3. If ϕ results from the substitution of anaphors for SRE occurrences in
a formula ψ, as in section 2-c of the formula deﬁnition, then the para-
phrases of ϕ are those of ψ.
4. Let ϕ(qP ) be a formula in which an occurrence t of the QNP qP is the
main QNP. Let s be an SRE not occurring in ϕ, and let ψ = ϕ[t/s].
(i) If q is every: the paraphrases of ϕ(every P ) are all the formulas of
the form: ((l) every Thing is Thing)∧(((l)a is P ) −→ ψ′[s/(l)a]),
where ψ′ is a paraphrase of ψ and l is an index that does not occur
in ψ′.
(ii) If q is some: the paraphrases of ϕ(some P ) are the formulas of the
form: ((l) some Thing is Thing)∧(((l)a is P )∧ψ′[s/(l)a]), where
ψ′ and l are as above.
Theorem 17 (Every Formula Has a Paraphrase that Translates a
Formula of FOL). Let L be a formal language in our system. If α is a
formula in L, then there exist a paraphrase α′ of α and formula απ in Lπ
such that α′ is µ(απ).
Proof: by induction on formulas in L.
1. Atomic formulas: the (only) paraphrase of s1 is s2 is itself, and it
is µ(s1 = s2); the paraphrase of s1 isn’t s2 is ¬(s1 is s2), and it is
µ(¬(s1 = s2)); the paraphrase of (s1, . . . , sn) is R is itself, and it is
µ(Rs1 . . . sn); the paraphrase of (s1, . . . , sn) isn’t R is ¬((s1, . . . , sn) is
R), and it is µ(¬Rs1 . . . sn).
2. If α, β do not contain anaphors of SRE occurrences, and α′ = µ(απ) and
β′ = µ(βπ) are paraphrases of α and β respectively, then: µ(¬απ) =
¬µ(απ) = ¬(α′), and this formula is a paraphrase of ¬α. Similarly,
µ(απ ∧ βπ) = µ(απ) ∧ µ(βπ) = (α′) ∧ ( β′), and this formula is a
paraphrase of α ∧ β. The proofs for α ∨ β and α −→ β are similar.
3. If ϕ is the product of substituting anaphors for SRE occurrences in ψ, as
in section 2c of the formula deﬁnition, and ψ′ = µ(ψπ) is a paraphrase
of ψ, then it is also a paraphrase of ϕ.
4. Let ϕ(qP ) be a formula in which an occurrence t of qP is the main
QNP, and assume that the theorem holds for any formula of the form
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ϕ[t/s], where s is an SRE. Let ψ be ϕ[t/s], where s is an SRE that
does not occur in ϕ (we thus have ϕ(qP ) = ψ[s/qP ]). Assume that
ψ′ = µ(ψπ) is a paraphrase of ψ.
(i) If q is every : µ(∀x((Ps −→ ψπ)[s/x])) =
((l)every Thing is Thing) ∧ (µ(Ps −→ ψπ)[s/(l)a]) =
((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ ((µ(Ps) −→ µ(ψπ))[s/(l)a]) =
((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ (((s is P ) −→ µ(ψπ))[s/(l)a]) =
((l)every Thing is Thing) ∧ (((l)a is P ) −→ µ(ψπ)[s/(l)a]) =
((l)every Thing is Thing)∧(((l)a is P ) −→ ψ′[s/(l)a]). And this
formula is a paraphrase of ϕ(every P ).
(ii) The proof for the case in which q is some is similar.

Lemma 6 (Paraphrases Do Not Contain SRE-Anaphors). Let ϕ be a
formula in a language L. If ϕ′ is a paraphrase of ϕ, then ϕ′ does not contain
any anaphors of SRE occurrences.
This lemma can be easily proved by induction on formulas in L.
It will be convenient to correlate with each formula in our system a unique
paraphrase ϕ′ which translates some formula of FOL.
Definition 35 (ϕ∗). Let L be a formal language in our system. With each
formula ϕ in L, we correlate a paraphrase ϕ∗ of ϕ, which is the translation
of some formula in Lπ.
8
Theorem 18 (Equivalence of ϕ and ϕ∗). Let ϕ a formula in a language
L in our system. Then:
(1) ϕ and ϕ∗ are semantically equivalent. That is: m |= ϕ ⇐⇒ m |= ϕ∗
for any model m for L.
(2) ϕ and ϕ∗ are deductively equivalent. That is: ϕ  ϕ∗ and ϕ∗  ϕ.
8In case L is denumerable, we can arrange its formulas in lexicographic order, and
deﬁne ϕ∗ as the ﬁrst paraphrase of ϕ that translates some formula in Lπ. Otherwise, we
can use the axiom of choice.
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Proof: (1) follows from (2) and the soundness of our deductive system
(theorem 7): If ϕ  ϕ∗ and ϕ∗  ϕ, then ϕ |= ϕ∗ and ϕ∗ |= ϕ. That is: every
model of {ϕ} satisﬁes ϕ∗, and every model of {ϕ∗} satisﬁes ϕ.
It remains to prove (2). We shall prove the following proposition by
induction on #ϕ:
(3) Let ϕ be a string. If ϕ is a formula in a language L (in our system), and
ϕ′ is any paraphrase of ϕ, then ϕ  ϕ′ and ϕ′  ϕ.
1. If #ϕ ≤ 3, then ϕ is an atomic formula in L. If ϕ is s1 is s2, then
ϕ′ = ϕ and (3) holds trivially. If ϕ is s1 isn’t s2, then α′ is ¬(s1 is s2).
To see that (3) holds in this case, one needs only to apply the rules NC
E and NC I. The proofs for (s1, . . . , sn) is R and (s1, . . . , sn) isn’t R
are similar.
2. Let #ϕ = n, and assume that (3) holds for any string ψ for which
#ψ < n.
(a) If ϕ is atomic, the proof is as above.
(b) Assume that ϕ ∈ {¬α, α ∧ β, α ∨ β, α −→ β}, where α and β
contain no anaphors of SRE occurrences. We shall prove (3) for
α ∨ β (The proofs for α ∧ β, ¬α and α −→ β are similar). By
deﬁnition 34, (α∨β)′ is α′ ∧ β′ , where α′ and β′ are paraphrases
of α and β respectively. By theorem 6, α′ and β′ do not contain
anaphors of SRE occurrences. Since, by the induction hypothesis,
α and β are deductively equivalent to α′ and β′ respectively, we
have: α  α′, β  β′. It follows that α  α′ ∨ β′ and β  α′ ∨ β′.
Therefore, it is not hard to prove that α ∨ β  α′ ∨ β′ . That is:
α ∨ β  (α ∨ β)′. The proof for (α ∨ β)′  α ∨ β is similar.
(c) Let ϕ be the product of substituting anaphors for SRE occurrences
in a formula ψ as in section 2c of the formula deﬁnition. If (3)
holds for ψ, then it obviously holds for ϕ; for ϕ is deductively
equivalent to ψ (to show this, one can apply the rules A I and A
E ), and they both have the same paraphrases.
(d) Let ϕ(qP ) be a formula in which an occurrence t of qP is the main
QNP. Let ψ be ϕ[t/s], where s is an SRE that does not occur in
ϕ. We thus have ϕ(qP ) = ψ[s/qP ].
i. If q is every, then ϕ′ is of the form:
((l) every Thing is Thing) ∧ (((l)a is P ) −→ ψ′[s/(l)a])
RAN LANZET HANOCH BEN-YAMI 217
where ψ′ is a paraphrase of ψ. We ﬁrst show that
(ϕ(every P ))′  ϕ(every P ).
Since (ϕ(every P ))′ contains no anaphors of SRE occurrences
(lemma 6), we have he following proof:
1 (1) ((l) every Thing is Thing)
∧(((l)a is P ) −→ ψ′[s/(l)a]) Premise
2 (2) s is P Premise
(3) s is Thing Th I
1 (4) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ (((l)a is P ) −→ ψ′[s/(l)a])
every E, 1, 3
1 (5) (s is Thing) ∧ ((s is P ) −→ ψ′) A E, 4
1 (6) (s is P ) −→ ψ′ ∧ E, 5
1, 2 (7) ψ′ −→ E, 2, 6
Now from the induction hypothesis it follows that ψ′  ψ.
And according to lemmas 4, 2 and 3, we can add lines to the
above proof until we get:
. . .
1, 2 (k) ψ Jk
And since ψ is ϕ[t/s], we can add the line:
1 (k + 1) ϕ(every P ) every I, 2, k
It remains to prove that ϕ(every P )  (ϕ(every P ))′.
Since ψ is ϕ[t/s], we have the following proof:
1 (1) ϕ(every P ) Premise
2 (2) s is Thing Premise
3 (3) s is P Premise
1, 3 (4) ψ every E, 1, 3
Now, from the induction hypothesis it follows that ψ  ψ′.
And according to lemmas 4, 2 and 3, we can add lines to the
above proof until we get:
. . .
1, 3 (k) ψ′ Jk
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We continue the proof:
1 (k + 1) (s is P ) −→ ψ′ −→ I, 3, k
1, 2 (k + 2) (s is Thing) ∧ ((s is P ) −→ ψ′) ∧ I, 2, k + 1
1, 2 (k + 3) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ (((l)a is P ) −→ ψ′[s/(l)a])
A I, k + 2
1 (k + 4) ((l) every Thing is Thing)∧
(((l)a is P ) −→ ψ[′s/(l)a]) every I, 2, k + 3
From the existence of the above proof it follows that
ϕ(every P )  (ϕ(every P ))′.
ii. If q is some, then (ϕ(some P ))′ is of the form:
((l) some Thing is Thing)∧ (((l)a is P )∧ψ′[s/(l)a]), where
ψ′ is a paraphrase of ψ. We ﬁrst prove that (ϕ(some P ))′ 
ϕ(some P ). Since (ϕ(some P ))′ contains no anaphors of SRE
occurrences, we have the following proof:
1 (1) ((l) some Thing is Thing)
∧(((l)a is P ) ∧ ψ′[s/(l)a]) Premise
2 (2) s is Thing Premise
3 (3) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ (((l)a is P ) ∧ ψ′[s/(l)a])
Premise
3 (4) (s is Thing) ∧ ((s is P ) ∧ ψ′) A E, 3
3 (5) (s is P ) ∧ ψ′ ∧ E, 4
3 (6) s is P ∧ E, 5
3 (7) ψ′ ∧ E, 5
From the induction hypothesis it follows, as before, that ψ′ 
ψ. And according to lemmas 4, 2 and 3, we can add lines to
the above proof until we get:
. . .
3 (k) ψ Jk
Since ψ is ϕ[t/s], we can apply some I, and add the following
lines to the proof:
3 (k + 1) ϕ(some P ) some I, 6, k
1 (k + 2) ϕ(some P ) some E, 1, 2, 3, k + 1
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It follows that (ϕ(some P ))′  ϕ(some P ).
It remains to prove that ϕ(some P )  (ϕ(some P ))′. We start
with the following proof:
1 (1) ϕ(some P ) Premise
2 (2) s is P Premise
3 (3) ψ Premise
From the induction hypothesis it follows that ψ  ψ′, and we
can add lines to the above proof until we get:
. . .
3 (k) ψ′ Jk
We proceed:
2, 3 (k + 1) (s is P ) ∧ ψ′ ∧ I, 2, k
(k + 2) s is Thing Th I
2, 3 (k + 3) (s is Thing) ∧ ((s is P ) ∧ ψ′)
∧ I, k + 1, k + 2
2, 3 (k + 4) ((l)s is Thing) ∧ (((l)a is P ) ∧ ψ′[s/(l)a])
A I, k + 3
2, 3 (k + 5) ((l) some Thing is Thing)
∧(((l)a is P ) ∧ ψ′[s/(l)a])
some I, k + 2, k + 4
1 (k + 6) ((l) some Thing is Thing)
∧(((l)a is P ) ∧ ψ′[s/(l)a])
some E, 1, 2, 3, k + 5
It follows that ϕ(some P )  (ϕ(some P ))′, as we wanted to
prove.

Definition 36 (T ∗). Let L be a formal language in our system. If T is a
theory in L, then T ∗ is {ϕ∗|ϕ ∈ T}.
Theorem 19 (Invariance of Entailment and Provability
under α −→ α∗). Let T be a theory in a language L, and let ϕ be a formula
in L. Then:
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1. T |= ϕ ⇐⇒ T ∗ |= ϕ∗
2. T  ϕ ⇐⇒ T ∗  ϕ∗
Proof: 1. Assume that T |= ϕ. Let m be a model of T ∗. If ψ ∈ T , then
m |= ψ∗, and by theorem 18: m |= ψ. We therefore have: m |= T , and it
follows that m |= ϕ. Therefore, by theorem 18: m |= ϕ∗.
The proof for T ∗ |= ϕ∗ =⇒ T |= ϕ is similar.
2. Assume that T  ϕ. Then there exists a proof D of ϕ from T . By
lemma 2, we can assume that no premise appears in D twice. Let 〈α(n)ϕJ〉
be the last line in D , and let TD(α) = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ T .
Since (by theorem 18) ϕ∗1  ϕ1, we have: {ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗n}  {ϕ1, ϕ∗2, . . . , ϕ∗n}.
And since ϕ∗2  ϕ2, we have: {ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗n}  {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ∗3, . . . , ϕ∗n}. We con-
tinue by induction and get: {ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗n}  {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}. We also have:
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}  ϕ, and since provability for theories is transitive (theorem 6),
we get: {ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗n}  ϕ. Theorem 18 ensures that ϕ  ϕ∗. And from the
transitivity of  for theories: {ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗n}  ϕ∗. Now, since ϕ∗1, . . . , ϕ∗n ∈ T ∗,
it follows that T ∗  ϕ∗. The proof for T ∗  ϕ∗ =⇒ T  ϕ is similar.

5.6 The equivalence between our system and FOL+EI
Theorem 20 (Equivalence). Let L be a formal language in our system,
let F be the set of all formulas in L, and Fπ the set of all formulas in Lπ. µ,
as a mapping from Fπ to F , has the following properties:
(1) µ is injective.
(2) µ covers F in the following sense: for each formula ϕ ∈ F there exists a
formula ϕ∗ ∈ µ(Fπ) that is both semantically and deductively equivalent
to ϕ (that is: ϕ and ϕ∗ are true in exactly the same models, and they
are provable from each other). Also, if T ⊆ F , ψ ∈ F , and T ∗ =
{α∗|α ∈ T}, then:
(a) T |= ψ ⇐⇒ T ∗ |= ψ∗
(b) T  ψ ⇐⇒ T ∗  ψ∗.
(3) µ preserves entailment and provability: for each theory Tπ ⊆ Fπ and
formula ϕπ ∈ Fπ:
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(a) Tπ ∪ EI |= ϕπ ⇐⇒ µ(Tπ) |= µ(ϕπ)
(b) Tπ ∪ EI  ϕπ ⇐⇒ µ(Tπ)  µ(ϕπ).
Proof: (1) is theorem 10. (2) immediately follows from theorems 18 and
19. It remains to prove (3). Let Tπ ⊆ Fπ and let ϕπ ∈ Fπ. We have:
µ(Tπ) |= µ(ϕπ) =⇒ (by theorem 15) Tπ ∪ EI |= ϕπ
=⇒ (by the completeness of the predicate calculus) Tπ ∪ EI  ϕπ
=⇒ (by theorem 16) µ(Tπ ∪ EI)  µ(ϕπ) =⇒ µ(Tπ) ∪ µ(EI)  µ(ϕπ)
=⇒ (by theorem 12 and the transitivity of provability) µ(Tπ)  µ(ϕπ)
=⇒ (since our system is sound) µ(Tπ) |= µ(ϕπ). The required equivalences
follow.

Theorem 21 (Completeness). Let T be a theory in a language L, and let
ϕ be a formula in L. If T |= ϕ, then T  ϕ.
Proof: Let F and Fπ be as in theorem 20. We have: T
∗ ⊆ µ(Fπ) and
ϕ∗ ∈ µ(Fπ). Therefore, there exist Tπ ⊆ Fπ and ϕπ ∈ Fπ such that µ(Tπ) =
T ∗ and µ(ϕπ) = ϕ∗. Now, by theorem 20, and by the completeness of the
predicate calculus, we get: T |= ϕ =⇒ T ∗ |= ϕ∗ =⇒ µ(Tπ) |= µ(ϕπ) =⇒
Tπ ∪ EI |= ϕπ =⇒ Tπ ∪ EI  ϕπ =⇒ µ(Tπ)  µ(ϕπ) =⇒ T ∗  ϕ∗ =⇒ T  ϕ.

Compactness is a consequence of completeness:
Theorem 22 (Compactness). Let T be a theory in a language L. Then,
T has a model iﬀ every ﬁnite T1 ⊆ T has a model.
Proof: If T has a model m, then m is a model of any ﬁnite subset of T .
Conversely, assume that every ﬁnite subset T1 of T has a model. If T does not
have a model, then T |= [s isn’t s], and from the completeness of our system
we get: T  [s isn’t s]. Now, since any proof uses only a ﬁnite number of
premises, there exists a ﬁnite T1 ⊆ T such that T1  [s isn’t s]. Since our
deductive system is sound, we have: T1 |= [s isn’t s]. Therefore: T1 is a ﬁnite
subset of T that does not have a model. A contradiction.

222 A FORMAL SYSTEM WITH PLURAL REFERENCE
6 Conclusion
An overview of the paper is due in this place. We started by describing, in
brief outline, a new semantic analysis of natural language, according to which
common nouns in noun phrases are often plural referring expressions, and
not – pace Frege – logical predicates. We then described, again in outline,
the implications of this analysis for the analysis of quantiﬁcation in natural
language.
This introductory discussion lead to the development of a new formal
system, built on the basis of the mentioned semantic analysis of natural
language. This system, unlike FOL but similarly to natural language, uses
concept-letters both as plural referring expressions and as predicates; it com-
bines quantiﬁers with concept-letters to form noun phrases, which occupy
in sentences the same place as singular referring expressions do; the way
anaphors are used in it is closer to the way anaphors are used in natural
language than to that in which variables are used in FOL; and more. We
have also compared and contrasted our system with many-sorted logic.
We deﬁned formulas, derivation rules and models for our system, and
proved it to be sound. We then turned to inquire its relation to FOL. For
that purpose, we added to FOL a set of axioms, EI . On the other hand, while
developing our system, we had introduced, having these future inquiries in
mind, a special predicate to our system, Thing, to which any interpretation
function assigns the whole domain. We correlated models in our system with
models of EI in FOL. Relying on all this, we showed how to translate formulas
of FOL into our system, and proved the translation to have the following
properties: ﬁrst, it is one-to-one. Secondly, it covers all the formulas in
our system in the following sense: every formula is both semantically and
deductively equivalent to a translation of some formula of FOL. Thirdly,
the translation preserves truth in a model, entailment, and provability. The
completeness and compactness of our system followed immediately.
Our system can be proved to be sound, complete and compact even with-
out the predicate Thing ; this, however, was not done here.
Accordingly, we have demonstrated that the new analysis of the semantics
of natural language can be used as a basis for the construction of a power-
ful formal system, sound and complete, which parallels FOL, in the sense
speciﬁed above. We have thus accomplished what we set out to do in this
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9A part of the proof of theorem 16 (p. 208) was erroneously omitted. This part is the
one dealing with the case in which the last line in the proof is justiﬁed by Id E.
